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CHAPTER I
INTl{ODUCTION

This study was made tor the purpose of investigating the
part played by the colonies in the Caribbean area in the revolt 01
the thirteen British colonies ot our Atlantic seaboard from the
mother country.

The Spanish, French. and Dutch possessions ot the

\,test Indies and the British colonies had important commercial
products_

They were tar from the direct control of their

ti va mother countries and were in the A.merican scene.

respec~

This paper

will attempt to show precisely how much and in what manner some of
these colonies helped or hindered the North American revolutionaries.
The lack of material and the limitation of space and
time have narrowed this study to the influence of St. Eustatius,
jthe role of the French \iest Indies. the action ot the French

~Jest

Indian fleet, and the aid, both secret and open, sent by France to
~he

North American colonists, without which the

~evolution

would

!have tailed.
A brief historical background of the West Indies is
p.ecessary to the

undars~anding

1

of the situation.

2

Near the end of the sixteenth century Sir Richard Grenville and Sir Walter Raleigh, and a little later Captain John
Smith and others, in the hunt tor eligible sites for colonies,
paid special attention tor awhile to the Orinoco region, lured
partly by the entiCing legends of El Dorado.

from South to

Nar~h

In their wanderings

America, where they founded the Virginia

colony, they were wont to pause among the Caribaes, and they did
not forget the prospect for colonizing thereabouts.

Such adven-

turous spirits had no respect for the Spanish title of possession
or rear of the native inhabitants.

For a time, however. English-

~en

were kept busy in Guiana and after the turn ot the century on

ithe

North American coast at Virginia and

~ad

made rough beginnings still farther north in Canada and had

~een

l~ew

England.

The French

feeding an appetite for possessions in newly discovered lands

~ey grew

desirous of a share in the tropical islands with whose

charms the corsairs had already made intimate acquaintance..
~etherland.

The

had begun operations with a trading company which

~irst

took possession where now the city of New York stands.

Dutch

smugp~er8

had long been prowling about the Spanish islands

With a specIal headquarters in the island ot St. Eustat1us, from
which they were driven, only to return.

A so-called admiral of

the Dutch took San Juan de Puerto aleo in 1615. but was killed far
his pains and no advantage eame of it.

In 1621 the Dutch West

India Cornpany was incorporated, which had colonizing. as well as

trading, purposes. 1
The Spanish colonization had been confined virtually to
the Greater Antilles.

A tew settlers had taken possession of the

islandJ adjacent to the Spanish Main. including Trinidad and CUra-

cao.

They were practically lett undisturbed in 'l'rinidad until

near the close at the eighteenth century. except tor the unceremonious call ot Sir Wa.lter Raleigh two hundred years before.

The

Dutch. whose title was altogether one of conquest (acquired during
the war between Spain and the Netherlands), captured Curacao and
its neighboring islands, Buenes Aires and Aruba, in 1634. and
slowly colonized them.
~he

Spain retained the rest ot what she called

"Sotavento," or Leeward, group ot islands. the finest ot which

was Margarita. until they went with Venezuela upon the achievement
at her independence. 2
The

t !rat otfi cia! English settlement

in the Weat Indie,

was made in 1624 by Sir Thomas Warner and his associates.

They

first took possession ot the island of St.Chr1stopher, extending

their claim to Nieves, which was
cized into Nevis.

by, and which was Angli-

At this t.ime there was one of those French

72-73.
2

C10S8

nwt., 73.

adventurers generally called corsairs, by the name ot Esnambuc,
prowling around.

In a tussle with a Spanish galleon which he had

failed to capture, his vessel was crippled, and he put in a.t

St. Christopher for repairs.

The English and French were then on

friendly terms, and as Warner was having a hard time with the

natives, he struck a bargain with Esnambue tor a combination
against the Caribs and an equitable division of the island.
was in 1625.

This

They had a hard struggle with the paeans * who per-

sisted in trying to hold their own, but tinally succeeded in
quelling, killing, and driving them out.

In 1629. the Spanish

from Hispaniola. who regarded this as an intrusion upon their
neglected preserves, made an unexpected visit and broke up the
settlements, driving the colonists away.

St. Christopher was al-

ways called the ftHother Colony" by the English and the "Mere
d' Antilles" by the French.

\'ihen the colonists returned alter the

first expulsion, England and France 'Were having a quarrel, and
each claimed exclusive possession.

The island passed from one to

the other several times, and was finally confirmed to Great

Britain.'

The French refugees of 1629 trom St. Kitt's. as it came
irreverently to be called. joined with other outcasts and

. J. Nellis· rel. Crouse t

1624-1664, New York, 1940,

~
lo-)~

P&gne'EI

lD. llll2.

~ ~41!1.

;
adventurers to seize upon the small island of Tortuga near the
north-western extremity ot Haiti.
means

Spain.

or

This piratical island was the

tinally wresting all the western part ot Hispaniola from

Sir Thomas Warner's colonists, who W€.lre recruited from

tune to time, had strayed over to Barbuda in 1628. and some who
were associated with him were among the settlers of Barbados even
ear liar, though the main colony there came out from England in
,

1625.

,

In 1632, Warner took possession at Antigua and ~iontserrat,

but a formidable rival was looming up.

After the death

ot James

~

the sham alliance with Spain was ended, and in 1627, King Charles
presumed to grant the whole range
Carlisle..

the Caribaee to the Earl of

This led to connicting claims t till the Cromwell re-

gime intervened to suspend them.
~he

or

Antigua, Barbuda. and some

ot

other northern islands were uninhabited when first taken, and

others were the resort of,smugelers and freebooters with whom
~hese

waters were infested.

The infant colonies first planted

bere did not thrive, and after the Restoration a new settlement
was made in Antigua under Lord Willoughby (to whom the island was
.
granted by Charles n), and the Earl of Car11sle. In 1680, Bar,

buda was given to the Codrington family.4

6
Dutch settlers took possession of St. Euatatius in 1635 1

and, although it did not escape attack in the wars which followed I

that and the neighboring island of Saba were finally confirmed in
the possession

or

Holland,.

Dutch emugglers were the first to

occupy Tortola" but they were not colonists, and \fere succeeded
by some English Quakers 'Who held peaceful possession, but were

ruined by emancipating their slaves,.

St. Martin in 16:;8 was a

headquarters for French rovers, or corsairs, but the Dutch _ -

glere divided its possession with them, and in 16)8 an amicable
division ot the island between French and Dutch was effected.
same year French colonists settled in St. Bartholomew.

The

All this

northern, part ot the Lesser Antilles was sparsely peopled and
feebly held by the aborigines t , and after one or two spasmodic

efforts Spain gave up all at tempt to exclude other nations from
them. S
Early in the seventeenth century, Spain's exclusive

right to possession in the
tested.

~est

Indies came to be seriously con-

By l6sg the Pope formally gave up the problem and in 1670

claims were abandoned by Spa1n herself.

For nearly two centuries

there was almost continuous war in which one or the other of the
colonizing powers was engaged.

S ~.f 75-76.

There were frequent contests tor

7
the possession of these islands, especially those of the Lesser
As we have already seen, some ot the original colonies

Antilles.

were established by conquest. 6

The nine years t:ouce ended in 1618, and hostilities wert
renewed between Spain and the

Netherlands~

England made a treaty

with the latter power in 1625 which brought her into conflict wit}

Spain

again~

tack upon

St~

It was in 1629 that the Spanish fleet made the atChristopher and drove out both English and French

In 1632 the Dutch took Tobago, and in l634, Ouracao.

settlers.

After the French took nominal possession of Guadeloupe, Dominica,
.

.

and Martinique in 1635, France was at war with Spain, which had
previously made peace wi th

England~

In 1638 the Spanish made a

descent upon St. Martin, which was jointly occupied by the French
and

Dutch, and took forcible

possession~

It was afterwards re-

covered and formal division of the island between Dutch and Frencll

was made in 1648.

Although Spain and England were nominally at

peace in 1638, an Enclish expedition attacked and plundered the
town of Santiago de la Vega in Jamaica.

In retaliation a Spanish

fleet trom Havana cleared out the inf'ant settlement at }Jew Providence in the Bahamas. 7

6

1;&4.,

1

11>,4-, 92 ..93.

92.

8
During the Commonwealth, the royalist sentiment was

strong in the British West

Indieo~

There was almost a revolt

under Governor Willoughby in Barbados; but a fleet came out with
Admiral Ayscue and settled the troublfl, inciden'tally capturing

some Duteh vessels on the way.

Cromwell adopted a vigorous polie)

in dealing with the pretensions

ot Spain,

and it was at this time

that the fleet was sent against Hispaniola and compromised by

capturing J&llaica, which Spain tried in vain to recover in 165$.,
There wa. a treaty of peace between France and Spain in 1660. _The
restoration of Charles II also brougnt peace between England and

France j but in 1665 England tell out w1th the Dutch, who were
joined the next year by France.

St. Kitt IS took to fighting.

Then the English and French in

The French got the upper hand and

drove the English out. but a neat came, up from Barbados and
reversed the process.
[:;'lla

At the same time the French captured Anti-

and Montserrat, but by the treaty of B!'eda in 1667 they were

~e3tored

to England. and the old division ot St. Kitt's was re-

established.

Trouble kept up for some years with pr1vateer'ing and

plundering upon the thriving trade

ot the Dutch. No further

changes ot po4lsession among the islands took place until the war
between France and Holland in 1688. when the accession of William
of Orange brought England into the contest on the Dutch side.

French again drove the English out of St, Kitt's and seised St.
Eustatius. While the En~~ish made unsuccessful attacks upon

The

9
The peace ot Ryswick, 1697. restol'"ed the old condi-

Guadeloupe.

tion, the Dutch retaining St. Euatatius and the French and EnelisJ
still dividing St. Christophcr. S
From 1102 to 1715 there was a war, with England and

Holland on one side and France and Spain on the other.

Much

privateering and plundering went on, but- there was no change

ot

territorial possession, except that the English drove the French
out of St. Kitt fa this time.

By the treaty of Utrecht the island

'Was .finally ceded to Clr-eat BrItain.

Jacques Cassard, the famous

French corsair. in the guise of a patr:lotic privateer, captured

St. Eustatius and Curacao, but only for the purpose ot extorting
a ransom.

There was a fierce contest between France and England

for the possession of the Carlbees during the Seven Years t \lar

from 1756 to 176).

In the meantime,Spain and Holland had been

losing prestige and were no longer rated as formidable powers. 9
It was in this contest between France and England that
Admiral Rodney and Sir Samuel Hood first came to the front as

British naval commanders.

At the beginning, the French were in

possession ot all the southern Oaribees. leaving Barbados and

8

~ •• 93-9~.

9

~••

94-.

10
Trinidad out

or

the category.

The English captured Guadeloupe in

1759, before the arrival of the home fleet, and held it till the
end ot the war.

Uodney sailed trom Barbados for Martinique in

January, 1162, with eighteen ships of the line and a considerable
force of soldiers.
foll~/ed

The island capitulated, and the conquest was

up with that of Grenada. Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent.

and St. Lucia in succession.
at the

ti~e,

Havana.

Spain was involved in the quarrel

and 1n P,1ay, 1162, Admiral Pocock. laid seige to

In a month Morro Castle

w~s

reduced, and soon after the

Governor ... General of Cuba capitulated when Lord Albemarle took

possession with land force/.:$.
po'Werrul~y
.

These naval victories contributed

to the peace of February, 1163.
.

By the treaty ot

Paris, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St. Lucia were restol'ed to
~rance,

and Cuba was left to Spain in exchange for Florida. While
l

Domil),ica, St. Vincent. Grenada, and Tobago were ceded to Great

aritain.
Tbe next clnteat for the possession of islands in the
Antilles came after France had joined the United 3tates in
1778 in their struggle lor independence from Great Drltain. 10

IUGSSer

10

~.t

95.

THE ROLE O}' ST. EUSTATIUS

At the outbreak ot the American

wero far from being self-sufficient.

~evolution

the colonist,

It was evident from the be-

ginning that outside help would be necessary if independence was
to be won.

\'/hsre was this immediate help to be obtained?

Since

the coloniats had already established illegal trade relations witl

the ttest Indies f it seemed only logical to continue this trade to
obtain the supplies needed.
Gunpowder was one of the greatest needs..

this lackot powder, tho different

co~onial

Bocause of

governr:1ents. the Con-

tinental Congress. and even private individuals atter:lpted to im-

port saltpetre and powder as well as manu!'acture them at home.
Georgia. was the only colony which did not import either oil these
before the fall of l777. 1

.

1

Orlando W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in '

1776", ~r~CAD
XXX, 27 •

",lt2r~£il

&eviIX, January, 1925. New York, 1925.

11

12

Almost all the powder imported during the first two and
a halt years ot the war came from France by way of the West
Indies.

Many or the carrying ships, following legalities, merely

touched at those islands on their way to colonial ports.

These

supplied were obtained in exchange far colonial products, some ot
whi ch went no larther than the West Indies, while some were forwarded to France.

Probably eighty per cent of the imported salt-

petre and powder reaching our shores came as a direct ,result of
the etforts put forth by authorities in the different countries
and by the

Continental Congress. 2
During this period, over one hundred different ships

brought supplies to our shores.
patrol

From this we conclude that the

ot British war ships along the Atlantic coast tell far

short ot establishing an effective blockade, and that full advantage was taken of the chances or getting through.

Furthermore,

the arrival of so many vessels suggests that the French govern-

ment both eecretly encouraged, and, at times, openly connived at
the illicit business carried on by her merchants in France and in
the West Indies.

Had there been a serious inclination on the part

of the French government to do so, doubtless it could have put a

2 lQid., 279.

13
stop to the shipping of military stores to the Americans.

The

total quantity of powder and other munitions allowed to come here
trom France and from ports under French control helps in a way to
measure the desire of the French government to break up the
~ritish

colonial empire and secure a part of it for France.

It

l'le1ps also to measure her disappointment at not being able to
retrieve her losses of 1763. 3
Be·cause of the close association of the fortunes of St.
~ustatius

with those of the American Revolutionary War, and the

limportant part which it played in aiding the colonists to continue
~hat

~s

difficult and unequal struggle, the story of this tiny island

worth telling.

~itled

J. Franklin Jameson has written an article en...

"St. Euatatiu8 in the American i1.evolution" which appeared

~n

.llu1 AmeriSM H!llCgr lSa.L j+ ev6. of 1903. Some ot the material

~n

St. Eustatius used in this study i8 based on this article.
Located near the northeast corner of the west Indian

phain, St. Eustatius is neither large nor fertile.

It is less

r..han seven square miles in area, and did not produce more than six
ltmdred barrels of sugar a year at the time of the Revolution.

ts fortifications were never important, and it had only one

3

.nwt.

14.
landing-place.

However. its position among the West Indian 1s-

lands was such as to give it, in the hands ot the Dutch, exceptional advantages.

Under the old system of colonial management,

typified by the Navigation Acts, each country endeavored to monopolize the commerce of its colonies.

The Dutch, however, had

been converted to the principles ot colonial tree trade.

Accord-

ingly,St. Eustatius. a free port belonging to a highly commercial
~ation
,

and located
in the middle ot rich and prosperous English,
,

French, Spanish, and Danish colonies managed under a restrictive
system, ha.d, even in times of peace, the opportunity to become an

important mart or trade.4.
When
~d
~ere

war existed between England

and

France or Spain,

the prohibitions of mutual intercourse between the islands
enforced by vigilant cruisers and eager privateers, the

~eutral

trade

or

St. Eustatlu8 flourished still more, and drew a

~ar larger population than it had in peaceful days.5

Let us go back to the beginning of the war t and especially to the days beiore the French alliance t when it was merely

Ia conflict between Great Britain and her revolted colonies and had
4. J. Franklin Jameson, "St. Eustatiu8 in the American
~evolutl()n, .. lb! Madey ijist;.QF&SM Rlnmlt New York, 1903, VIII,
~g.3-68At..

I""""

15
not widened into a European war.

The war. and the non-import at ion

.,hich preceded it, had cut otf at one blow the supply of British
~anuractures

to the American colonies.

It was true that the native American inventiveness would in
time supply their place. The mu~e 1ngloriua 'hired men' who
would do anything with a jack-knife, the versatile Jonas ot
Mr. Abbot t s tancy. we uld blossom forth as the Yankee inven....
tor. But this would take time; and. in the meanwhile, it was
very convenient to have in the neutral. islands of the l'iest
Indies a,6means of temporary supply and a market for American
exports.
The trade ventures of states 8.8'we11 as of individuals were often

carried on in this way.

For instance, Abraham van Sibber, agent

ot the state of Maryland at St. Eustatius, was taking care of
cargoes sent or underwritten by the state, as aarly as March.

1776.

There are letters from him, addresued to the Virginia com-

~ttee

of safety in the archives of Virginia.

In June of the same

year, Van Blbber of- st. Eustatiws and Richard Harrison of Joiartl,.
~ique

announced that they had formed a partnership. and solicited

a portion of their custom trom the Virginia committee.?
When France entered the war on the side ot the

American~

French islands like Martinique and French carriers became lnell. glble to conduct such a trade. and the position of the Dutch

6

~.,

684-685.

7

~b&d.t

68,.

-

16

neutrals became doubly profitable.

British merchants stored thell

goods at St. Eustatius to keep them safe in case ot an attack by
the French.

John Adams, in 1779, wrote to the president of Oon-

gress saying that closer diplomatic relations with the republic
of the United rletherlanda would be justified because
ing trade through the island ot St. Eustatius. 8

ot the grow-

British armed

vessals were enabled to cruise ott the Azorea and in other situations well adapted for checking the voyages ot French and Spanish
vessels to the West Indies because ot the close diplomatic relatiousbetween Portugal and Great Br1tain. 9 This threw West Indian commerce more and more into the hands of· the Dutch and of St~

Jameson otter. two examples.

Eustatius.

He tells of a Dutch reu

admiral who, during thirteen months there, reports that over

thirty-one hundred vessels sailed trom the island during the time

ot his stay.

An English observer reports that in 1779 80me twelve

thousand hogshead. of tobacco and one and a half million ounces of
indigo came to it from North America. to be eXCh&lged tor naval

s llWl••

68,5-686.

'1ft9,!1,Dl.suQQt;&g
III,

9 Francu \1harton, ad. f .Trut iIX2,ytiQ
Qorr_esoondence Slt. ~ Un.t: ed WCilttl-;-Washington.

~17"'71S

17
supplies and other goods from Europe. 10 British traders, supposedly bound tor St. Christopher, would embark on trading ventures
to St. Euatatius.

They were careful, however, to take out sepa-

rate insurance policies on the two voyages from England to St.
Christopher and from there to St. Eustatius.
neutral islands was encouraged by

This trade with the

~

act pD.ssed in 1780, although
the trade with the revolting colonies was not approved. ll

During the Revolutionary War, St. Eustatius was the
quickest and safest, and at times the most important. means ot
communication between American representatives abroad and the
Continental Congress at home.

In Marcil, 1777 t Lord Suffolk was

inf'ormed by an agent at Rotterdam that Messrs. Willing and l<1orria

of Philadelphia had written to a Rotterdam merchant that he could
write by way o£ St. Euatat1ua. because they would have regular
communication with that 1sland. 12

Ordinarily the enrichment of the Dutch West Indies 'Would
~ot

have grieved the British.

~ustatlus

Britieh resentment against St.

was aroused to such a violent pitch by the fact that the
10 Jarneson, "St. Euatatius in the

11 .:Ql~~
12

l.lllSl.

I~erican

Revolution. n

island was made the means of an enormous export ot military supplies to the American armies, and later of naval supplies to the
maritime torces arrayed against England in the Caribbean.
~rch

On

20, 1175, at Yorke's in8istance, the States General ot the

United Netherlands issued a proclamation forbidding the exporta~ion

of warlike stores or ammunition to the British colonies in

America or to any other place without the permisSion of one ot the
polleges
~ustatiu.
~hat

ot Admiralty. The tremendous increase in trade from st-.
had been noted as early as the end of 1774.

All during

winter there were two agents trom Boston at Amsterdam buying

stores and gunpowder.

The Dutch prohibition was constantly evaded

even after it was published.

The "admiralties" were not too vigl-

.ant about executing the prohibition ot the States General and the
pOWlctl ot State.

Beeauae of the lack at· gunpowder, the Second

Continental Congress, in October, 1175, recOmmended that the vari...
states export provisions to the West Indies in order to obtain
~ms and ammunition. 1 )
~UI

A merchant at Campveere informed Yorke early in Ioiarch,
~776,
~o

that a favorite way to take ammunition to the Americans was

load tor the coast of Atrica but then to go to St. Eustat 1us,

19
~ere

"their cargoes, being the most proper assortments, are 1n-

stantly bought up by the American agent8."1~ The high price ot

powder proved a great temptation to the Dutch merchants.

Jameson

reports that 1n April, the profit on gunpowder at the island was

one hundred and twenty per cent. l ;

Lord Suffolk received a report trom a Rotterdam merchant that powder which cost torty or forty-two florins a hundred-

weight in Holland sold tor two hundred and forty florins a hundredweifpt at the island.
rice

~barrela.

This was sent disguised in tea-chests,

and the like.

ships had gone out by
American market. 16

~AY

The report continues, eighteen Dutch

with powder and ammunition for the

Most ot the powder used by the American army 1n 1176
came into its hands in this way.

In May Yorke informed Eden that

"St. Eustatius was the rendezvolJ,a

or

everything and everybody

meant to be clandestinely conveyed to America.

It was ea8Y to get

oneself carried thither, and military adventurers ot all nations
have congregated at the island."11 Holland and especially Amsterdam remained the chlef source of supply.

14- llWl·

15 DJ&!., 681-688.
16 lW., 6SS.
17

~.,

688.669.
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These underhand dealings did not go unnoticed by th$
British ambassa.dor.

He urged increased activity on the part of

the British cruisers, elicited resolutions from the States General's comrl1ittee of foreign affaira condemning such traffic, and
urged the pensionary of Holland to do all that he could.

Moreovex

the Dutch constitution was so complicated and cumbersome that
nothing could be accomplished.

Large numbers of people were in-

terested in this trade, although most people supposedly condemned
The city of Amsterdam was especially interested in it.

it.

Van

Breckel. the pensionary of that city. constantly worked to thwart
the British ambassador.
When the Dutch prohibitions expired in autumn, the

British government sent a memorial of protest to the States General.

That governing body issued a

pI~oclamation

torbidding the

exportation of warlike stores or ammunition to the revolted colo-

nies tar one year from October 10, 1176.
pected from this proclamation.

Nothing much was ex-

This is evident trom the fact

that Suffolk 8ugeested that the amount of military

stm~es

sent to

the Dutch West Indies should not be larger than the average export
in the years before the war. and that the Dutch colonial govern-

ments be compelled to r,ive an account of their expenditure.

Yorke

suggested to Eden that, since the Dutch did not make the proper
USe

of the gunpowder they manufactured, they should not be allowed

to take home any saltpetre.

The trade, however, went on.

At

21
intervals the trade did slacken because of the action ot the

British cruisers, or because of the glad tidings from Long Island, '
or' bE<oause of overstocking by the Amsterdammers. 18
These satisfactions were short-lived.

For instanee. a

!British captain reports that he stopped a Dutch ship sailing home
from the island to Flushing with one thousand seven hundred and

fifty barrels of gunpowder.

The Dutch sailing master admitted

loIhat he had already sold seven hundred and fifty stands of arms

and three thousand barrels of gunpowder at the :i.sland; but that he
was taking the remainder home after 'Waiting sevell months to sell

it.

The British captain thought that he was going out beyond the

range of British cruisers to meet a vessel to which he

fer' his stocks.

~fo\lld

traneo

There was a vessel found sailing in the neighbor-

hood without cargo, the occupants of which eaid that they were
CI'uising for pleasure. 19
In the middle of the year Johannes de Graatr. the secre-

\.Jary, repla.ced the governor

ot the island, but he did no better.

The port was opened wit.bout reserve to American ships.
~er
~o

On Novem-

5, 1776, Van BIbbsI' wrote to the Maryland councilor sa.f'ety
urge them to send all their vessels to St .. Eustatius rather

.1 .M.
18 Ibid., 689-690.

19 Ib:\1., 690.
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than to any other island, "as the Dutch have discovered tha.t their
l::lWS

when put in force must ruin their !-terchants..

I am on the

best terms with His Excellency, the Governor, and have his word
and promise relative to some partiC\.u.ars that

isfaction and puts much in our powers.

~ives

me great sat-

I was not so happy taking

the Com!:1and, but He are as well fixed "dth him no", as

the former."

Two weeks later he

evor'! day in the road.

Ioi' Government until
~ence

th(~y

~lrote:

\Ie Wl~I'e

with

"Our Flag flys current

The :Merchants here are al\1ays complaining
v'lOuld gi va as much Protection and Ind'ul-

here to us as the French and Spaniards do... ••

T'na Gover-

lor is daily expressing the greatest desire and intention to

protect a tra.de with us here.

Indeed they begin to discover their

pustake and are noW very jealout3 of. the Frencht~ runnine away with

~ll theil' trade. n2 Q
On I<iovember 16, 1776, an event occurred which brought
~rit.iah resentrn~..nt to its highest point.,

A vessel of the new

Pontinent,nl navy, .the t\n,drew ~q£i!f under Captain Isaiah Itob1nson.

n.ying the nEnf flaf~ of thirteen stripes, anchored oft St. Eusta",ius, and_ a8,1uted Fort Orange with eleven guns; and the salute waa

roetm'ned.
~as

This was thought to be the first time the A.'Ilerican flag

saluted in a foreign port.

20

l~!d.,

690-691.

However, on the preceding

23
october 21th, an unnamed American schooner on lenr...nG the Danish
island of St. Croix with a small oargo of powder salut.ed the tort
and ha.d the compliment retllrned. 21
However, the affair at St. Eustat1us was .:iora noticeable.

The arrival and reception of the

~2K P~ii

indil.1lation of the president of St. Christopher.

roused the

CorJmenti.ng very

severely on the salute, and summing up the many Violations of

neutrality he had observed trom his island, he sent the document
to DeGraaf!.

Simultaneously, he sent an ind1:"')1ant account to the

secretary of state in London.

In this account. President Great-

head commented severely on the open encouragement and protection

which the

rebel~

received at the Dutch !aland, and the constant

equippin,?; and. fittine ...out of privateers to prey on British com...

m€Tce.

He was especia.lly angered by.the incident of the sloop

£}~,l tiamm;:e li..~r2,

\Ihi eh,

on

flying the flag of the Continental Congress,

t~ OVE~rr:b er

21 t almost \41. tf-J.n range of' the guns of Fort

Orange, had t,aken a British brigantine and then returned to the

road of St. Eustat1u8, with flag .flying, and there received every

si(~n of aid and protection. 22

21

i;Qiq".

691.

22

X~~a.t

691-692.
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As Lord aurfolk stated.
hunc;c paid a I'eb€.cl
f,i'{;:;:SS.

(l'hl::,~

tl~

~r1g&ntine c~:.:.rrying

greatest offense was the
the flaG ;,)£ ttc rebel Con-

governor's refly that he was trf'm- trow betraying any

partiality 'bctv,;een Great :Brita.in and hel' North A;lleric"m colonies.
was insolent and not to be overlo(.)ked.

sent to 311' Joseph Yorke
States GehtJral.

£:~

The secrct,,'1!'Y of stntc

me;rrol'1al which hE: prenent;20.1 to the

After 2:1 ving an account of Dc Gruaff, IJ connivance

at the ille,snl trade and

th~

fitting..-out of privateers, and the

out:cn;::e of ruturning the .i\.merican salu.te, the :ninistE.r d(;clal'cd
th':'l t

he

ordered

Wtts

Uto expressly demand of your High flightiness fl forl'!l~l disavowal of the auute by Fort Orange, at St. Eustatius t to the
:1"€bel shiP. the disr.lission fmd immediate recall of Governor
van Grad!, and to declare further, on the part of His Maj ...
e~ty, that until sati:sfaction is given they arc n;;;t to expect
that His f.1,ajosty will sutf'er himself" to be amused by more
assurances. or that he will delay one inst311t to take such
measl~es as ho ,hall think due to the interests and dignity
ot his crown." 2J
Appropriate :aeasur(:s had already been taken.

The lords

islands atation to post cruise;rs otf the road of' St. Lustatiua.

search all Dutch ships tor ams, ammunition, clothing, and send
sow~

violators to

-.,

•

,

'11

port of the Leeward Islands s to be detained

25
until turthr:I" orders; and thene injnnctions were to l)f'l mnintn.iI':;ed,
for

•

""

S:lX weE\<.. s '"

24-

The llnt.ch Republic could not resnnt the tone of the
Enp.;l:ish me.nor;.als because of its comp15.cr..ted. m.achin ":1"'Y' "

In their

rep1:" they disavowed their go,'ernor t s action [lnd ordercd h'.m to
corlO 11011'1.(;'. to eX!1luin his actjions.

PleadinG aee. fC"D." of seasick....

ness, and the recent illness of himself and his fcurr:tly, he

mor€! than a year eominr; home.
on.

,1(15

In the meanwhile the s.3.lutea went

Count Bylnndt, who S'l}cceeded DeGt-aatr in ':TIur:Lne zlw.tters,

\"/~1tcl:ed~:lore
a1tho~lgh

he

closely over the execution of tho neutrality laws,
\IQS

[lccuse ..1 of treati.nr: the A.rnericans "n.th the same

civil1.t}" as t,he cltize.ns of other nations.

Tho- tEtnha.ss!J.dor

W~i.S

notified that the British \lOt:.ld not tci;:e any more Dutch ships
~~less

they had naval or warlike stores on board

bconu~e

St.

Eustatius proved very usei'ul to the Windward Islands in time of

Sc~city.25
DeGraafi' reached bome in July, 177g.

defense in

He presented this

Febr~~ry:

He declared that he had never cormived at trade in .munitions
of war; that the Ba:\timgre ~ had not been fitted out at
the island but by the council in Maryland; that her prize

was not made within range of his guna, but. much nearer to

24

~.

25 11a1d., 694.

~i; ~;~!;;~p~:~~ ;~~~;~ =f!~t ~W~fl~~! tJn~ch~r:Ee h~;d

by

fired, that t:;.-~is 'W'D.S the usue..l return s~11ute to merch.:imt
vessels, and implied no recognition of American independence;
that on accvcati em by Vice-lui'l11ral Young ut;ainst ~/a.'1. Eibber,
as concerned in fitting out privateers he had placed the
·, ....:r..iv,-"l
'\.40
Q.~

~.,fJ/
.~ d"','<'\r>,"'d
bt~
..... 0 .........
... 0·'" t;..tt
'~~('~.4
... ~r'i*""
...,;J..
~1.
C~'l~&' bac'<·c;~
~
J ""'
~
...... ~~.4w
v.....
•

j., ..

>

........

'.-,

;t h"'d
.,~t;4.

1''''A-;''
""'.~W..lo

been his custom to require incoming AInerican vessels to g1 ve
~Jonds for due observa.nce of: neutroJ.ity while in::'ho POI"t;
that he had compelled all persons on the island posseusing
~., ·n~)c··'·""'r.'"
t f'\ +-,~ 1,.. 0" +.ll .... , .. '~t .•t.",,;'\:;:.j
l-. "''''r "0
"l;~ 110"- €lv'~.
.:;."-",,,
!
\f
...,1,0.1-""'",.'.;;.. iJ ,~ t to Nor'·"
America; that he had appointed a customs olerk visitor or
shii;S in or <1e:1':' to flnJ. arlit3 1f any were 1::"'1e..::;a11] car:cied. 26
~''''~:'''J.

."vi

L""
VUAlr.<;,.;.i

Bl':~.ish. comr~iaJ:ldt.1n.l
ap:Jc,~nted

g:>vernor.

{,;,_ vI

L,-~\.:~

".t!,j.(';';.'

t,hnn against the rJ1.1tch.
,'llld

his actions

Arnel'ic:ms that t\iO privateers ri€J.re

A neutrality which

tla;':;

'l.iet'o
lldI;H;d

v

, :.~

Ji,.

.DeGraafi' was again

so accaptablc to t.he
uftel' h1J;;. and hls lady.2?

so cotn;>lc'tcly satisfactory one belligerent

and so unacceptablsa to the otht:l" could not haVE; been p·:;;rfect. 2S
In the spring

ot 1780, when Sir George Rodney arrived

to tw):e COmI"'...and of the British fleet. 1n the '_Jest Indies, the situation

WB.S

8til1 '1ery st.rai.neu.

Aft.Elr an unsl.lceessful battle With

GuiGhen off :t<at"'t.i.rdque, April 17. 1780,

rtodne~r

declarod that two

26 loid., 694-695.
27 r:fOdirey Basil r4undy, :rlf.~ Lite .:m.4 Corre§ponden92
th~ Late Adra;il:@;l L.9r4 Hosin e;£. London. 1636;I!~ 4'be
28

695.

9!

Jaroeson. "St. Eustatius in the American Revolutiol'l,"
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vesHe1s sa.iled
~nd

Fren<:;}l

filled with carpenters.

fleet, and,

fleet.. 29

St. Eustrrtius, loaded with nav::tl stores and

trOT.1

bOCatw0

These ves:3els joined the

of t}-\eir help. eieht French vessels,

Rodney seems to hnve conce! ved a deep £'f>e1in[: of hosH~ la~er

miles :1.n. len.cth and. three

~.n

lV'rote, "Thi:':'!

rod~

nf only

su

breadth, had done Enr).tilld More hal"'r.'l

thar: n11 the arms nf her ':lOst potnnt enemies, and

::110116

Su.y)Ilorted

the :!.::tf'u,,,,:;ouse 1\.me::'1 can ~"cbel1ion. ,,)0
Bjr
Becn.l~.se

this time the unr had become. a

I~uropcan

one as \mll.

the Dut ch had tc'oorne thfJ chief nelltraJ. carl'ior-s in the

Unitpd States, nnd also because of the d5.spute over t.1H1 doctrine
01 .; free ships :nak'3 free L1'()ods n t the feeling betlfecm -Sneland and

Holland was bccot.'1:ing worse and worse.
EUl"O})f;;\Ull pO\ferS were uni tinf£

trality oi' 17$0.

against En;;land in the i\rmod Neu-

The Dutch 1fol!.ld ?robably El3roe.

with the Dutch cmt1e, all the northern
COlliiilon

Aruilil'aJ..

caus'! against E:ng;!.and.

f1undYi The Lite

30

Ibid

Lord itodn~IJ

I·'

II, 97.

po~n's

If t:.he

breaJ~

\:auld unite in a

A pretext for start,ing a

rr; jD. .m.u!

29

t

At thia tune the nOl"thm.'n

Cgrre lRol'ulens e

Sll

:th~

war

with

ldWl

the Dutch came with the discovery of a proposed Dutch-American

treaty among the papers

bY the British.
and an agent

or

Henry Laurens, when he was captured

The draft was signed only by an aeent of Congress

or the c1ty of Amsterdam. Sir Joseph Yorke. in two

memorials presented to the States General, demanded a tormal repudiation ot the conduct ot the Amsterdam magistrates.

was

80

The tone

threatening that insurance to St. Euetatius rose to twenty

or twenty-five per cent.
The repudiation was promptly sent, but. because

or

the

Dutcll constitution, it was difficult tor the States General to

punish the offiCials of one particular city.

Their reply was un-

satisfactory', and on December 20, 1780, England declared war on

the Netherlands.

Unable to prepare rapidly for war, Holland be-

came an easy prey.

In tact, beiore Yorke left The Hague two

hundred Dutch ships, with cargoes valued at fifteen million flor-

ins, were seized.)l
Even before his first memorial Yorke eaw the advantages
of taking the Dutch colonies in America.

Their loss would affect

the Netherlands the most, would stop the rebels' trade and sup-

plies, would close a channel

or

correspondence and connection with

•

696-697.

31 Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution,11

29
North America.

The British could use St. Eustatius as a depot

till satistnct10n is given tor the past, and security for the
future. 32 Yorke ureed immediate action beoause he had heard that
ten or eleven Dutch men-of-war were preparing to sail tor the
West Indies.
\ihen Yorke's letter relating to 3t. Eustatius 'Was referred to the admiralty, Stormont informed Yorke on December 5,
that he was preparing Uto send secret orders to seize the Dutch

settlements in the West Indies."))

Orders to conquer the Dutch

islands. beginning with St. Eustatius and St. }<lartin, were sent
to Rodney and to l<1ajor-General Vaughn, the commander ot British
land farces in the West Indies, on the day that war was declared.
Lord Stormont also declared that tfhe was persuaded, upon best intormation, that we should never have been in our present
~ere

situati~

it our good fortune that St. EU8tatius had been destroyed or

sunk in the ocean.-3i
Rodney arrived at Barbados on December 6.

Rear-Admiral

Sir Samuel Hood joined him before the end of the year.

About the

middle of January, Rodney made his useless attack upon St.

Vincent.

He rece! ved the declaration of war and his secret orders

.. 697-698.

32

.~,g

)3

~.,

34 1;lai51.

698.

)0
on the 27th of January, sailed from St. Lucia, after embarking
Vaughn's troops, on the 30th.

On February 3, he appeared before

St. Eustatius and demanded the instant surrender

or

the island

and all that it contained.);
There was no possibility

or

defenau~, 80

Graaf! surrendered unconditionally in an hour.

Qovernor De-

Count Frederick

van Bylandt. commander of the lone Dutch frigate, atter tiring
two broadatdea for his honorIs sake, also surrendered.

body of American sailors, atter a show

A large

ot resistance. were forced

to surrender because of hunger and Vaughn's troops.

A detachment

of British troops captured the islands of St. Martin and Saba.
The Dutch flag was kept flying over the town and tort

80

that

Dutch, French, Spanish. and American ship" might be decoyed into
the harbor and se1z·ed aa the spoils of war. 36

Rodney, surprised at the stores ot materials, wrote to
his wite, "The riches of St. Euatatius are beyond all comprehen-

sion. • ••

All the magazines and store-houses

ar.8

tilled, and

even the beach is covered with tobacco and sugar. "37

.

8.y March 26.

the admiral reported that about t1f"ty American vessels, loaded
with tobacco, had been captured.

According to Lord George

35 . Mundy. 1h.f! lJhl iWl QQFre:u?oqdenql gt: !Ja ~
A.dm'r&\ lt2Es! Rg9IUII, 'II; ~.
)6 Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution,"
700.
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~rmain,

'the island was a vast magazine of all kinds of military

,tores • ' Although Rodney had been told that there was none to be
~d, several thousand tou

ot cordage were round., Some authori-

ties estimated the value of the capture at more than three milliol'l
pounds sterling.'

The admiral wrote to h1s wife, with understanda-

ble pride, that "There never was a more important stroke made

against any state whatever."3S
John Adams, who was in Holland at the time. in a letter

to secretary LiVingston, reports the reaction ot the Dutch people
to this disaster.'

You can have no ideal sir, no man who was not upon the spot
can have any idea, or the gloom and terror that was spread
by this ',event. The creatures of the court openly rejoiced
in th~s. and threatened, some ot them in the most impudent
terms. I had certain information that some or them talked
high of their expectati ons of popular insurrections against
th~ burgomasters or Amsterdam and M. VanBreckeli and did
I;lr. Adame the honor to mention him"l~s one that was to be
hanged by the mob in such company.''''';:1
There was great exultation in England.

Government stocks rose

one and one-half per cent.

wrote to her husband:

Lady Rodney

Your express arrived on the morning ot the 13th (£'!arch). My
houae ~s been like a fair trom that time till this. Every
friend, every acquaintance came. I went to the draWingroom on 'l'bursday following. It was more crowded than on a
birthday; and the spirits which every one was in were

3g 1l11!l., 701.
39

6~'s&'

32
enlivening to a degree. and the attention and notice Ire.
ceived from their Majesties was sU£ficient to turn my poor
brain. • •• This glorious news has been a thunderbolt to
the opposition, very few ot whom appeared in the Houee ot
Commons. Ne~otlations towards peace had been talked of tor
some time be ore its arrival'J.and it cannot fail to produce
a favorable etfect upon them.~
As

a reward tor what he had done, Rodney was raised to the

peera~

and was ~ven an annual pension of two thousand pounds. 41

What would Uodney and Vaughn do with their great prize?

Rodney left no doubt as to his opinion of the island when he

called it:
A nest ot v~per8, a nest of villains; they deserve scourging
and they shall· be scourged. • •• An asylum for men guilty
ot every crime, and a receptacle tor the outcast ot every
nation; men who will make no scruple to propagate every
falsehood the~r debased minds can invent. \19 thought that
this ne,t of emuge].ers, adventurers, betrayers of their
country t and' rebels to their k:1ng, had no right to expect a
capitulation, or to be treated as a re8pectabl~)eOPle J
their atrocious deeds deserve none, and they 0
t to nave
known. that the just venge.anee ot an injured emp re J though

slow, is sure.

He wanted to leave the island,

"inste~d

of the greatest emporium

on earth, a mere desert, and only known by report. "42

His anger was greatest against the British merchants ot the 1s-

land, partioularly those who became Dutch citizens in order to

40 Mundy,

DS2

42

II, 1), 97.

~

i2smlX. .,;r.41 loW., II, 62.

Adm'h"al ~

~,a.J

iD.ft

Cgrrg§pondi!lS!

9!

tnt; ~

)3

carryon the illegal trade.

ism

ot most

of the British who lived in the West Indies.

lia desire
eousness.

In tact, Rodney doubted the patriot-

tor personal

gain

\,lSS

ming,led with hi. right-

His earliest letters etate that all 1a the King's and

he i8 entitled to nothing. 43
admiralty this request J

Three days later he sends to the

"It His I>1ajesty is graciously pleased to

bestow any part of the spoil between the navy and army, he w111
dictate in what manner his gracious bounty may be be.towed, that
all altercations and disagreements may be prevented between" the

two serv1ces. 44
Started in the spirit of anger, Rodney's measures were

very comprehensive,

He ordered that all the inhabitants

or

St.

Eustatiu8 were to be considered prisoners ot war, and that all

property was to be confiscated tor the King.

Burke branded

Rodneyfs action as;
a general confiscation ot all the property found upon the
island. public and pr1vate t Dutch and British, without discrimination, without regard to lriend or toe. to the subject.
of neutral powers! or the subjects ot our own state; the
wealth or the opu ent, the goods ot the merchant, the utensils of the artisan, the necessaries of the poor, were seized

43

~., II, 1),

44

~.,

II, 21

16.
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on, and a sentence ot general begGary pronounced in one
moment upon a whole people. 45
The admiral's other orders were equally drastic.

There

should be no plundering; no one, not even the officers, was to go

ashore; the English inhabitants ot the Leeward Islands were
ordered to stay away trom the island; all naval stores were to be
lent to the government shipyard.e at Antigua; supplies intended

tor St. Domingo should be sent to Jamaica; all goode sent from
Europe should be sold publicly tor the King; all goods produced
in the West Indies and in Amari oa were to be sent in convoy to

Eneland; the "lower town" should be dest.royed or unroofed, and

the materials sent to Barbados. St. Lucia, and Antigua. 46

Oommu-

nication with the Windward Islands unde.r flaf~ of truce was £or-

biddon. 41
The execution of these orders caused much hardship.
Prisoners ot war were at the mercy of the admiral.

Samuel Ourzon,

an agent of Congress, and Isaac Gouveneur. Jr... his partner. were

lent to FAlgland as prisoners of war.
treason,

70j.
I. _" . t_.. _'l

tQiIJ.l.n~m"t'....u,dl.",

but~

45

They were convicted ot

after serving only thirteen months, they 'fere
Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the Amerioan Revolution,-

46 r.iundy; l'mt 1U.I. ans C9£t: e IRQ!lMpge 9l.
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released by the Rockingham ministl"Y.

treated better than the others.

4'

35
The French merchanta were

They were sent to

~~tin1que

and to Guadeloupe f and were a.llowed to take with then their house-

hold furniture, plate, linen, and even their slaves.

The gover-

nor, the Dutch. American, Bermudian, and British merchants were tCi

be permitted or forced to retire, taking their household goods
~ th

them.

The sugar .... planters were the only ones to be treated

with favor. 49

Since most ot Europe was either at war tlith

F~gland

or

sympathized with her enemies, the devastation of St. Eustatius
aroused a storm of protest.

In London the merchants ot the \'1est

~., 11,.32, 44-46.
1aiiiison, "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution,"
704-705, states that ths"execution of these decrees caused much
~ardship. Warehouses were locked, and merchants were denied
permission to take inventories. All of their books and papers
!were seized, and their cash was taken from them. The captain ot
a Dutch supercargo, in a sort of diary, gives a vivid picture at
the searchings of -portmanteaus and pockets, the dif~l~ng in gardens
for hidden specie, the destruction of houses, the seizing of
Inegroes; the appropriation of riding horses by the officers, and
~he daily work ot shipping goods and. sending away the inhabitants
in cqmpan1es, llc'ltion by nation. Rodney treated the warnings of
the assembly of St. Christopher with contempt.
The Jews were the most severely punished. They were
deprived of their property, banished without their wives and
children, and given only one day's notice. One hundred and one ot
~hem were confined in a weighbouse and strip~d or their clothing

.

49

W!11eh was ripped and the linings were searched. TheBri tish
obtained eight thousand pounds sterling in this way.

36
India Company presented a useless petition to the Crown.
AmSterdam merchants sent a protest.

The

It also became the subject

of debate in the House of Cotilnlons during the month ot J';tay, 1781.
'!'he debate war; reopened in December when Rodney and Vaughn, who

",ere members of the House, were able to be present at an inquiry
into their conduct.

Edmund Burke led the opposition.

He argued

that Uodneyt s confiscation of private property was illegal and
!Without precedent, and that the inhabitants, entitled to royal
protection, could not all be punished for the crimes ot the few.
~oreover,

the properties were sold at auction at tar less than

their value. 50

More important to his professional career was the accusation that Rodney, excited by the tremendous value of his prize,

stayed at St. Eustatius eagerly supervising the disposal of the
_poil and in this way lost the chance of important naval successes
pffered him by the temporary weakness ot the allies in the Carib~ean.

vlhile he was spending more than three months at the island,

pe Grasse slipped around Martinique, watched only by Hood's squadron, and jOined the rest of the French fleet off Fort Royal.

It

this juncture of the French had not been accomplished, the battle

or

Yorktown would never have happened.

It Rodney had been to the

windward ot Martinique, where Uood wanted him to be, the juncture

705.

50

Jameson. "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution,·
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of the French fleet would not have occurred. 51

Thus, St. Eusta-

tiUB and its supplies, before and after its capture, was of

great positive and indirect aid. 52

Atter careful preparation, a large neet of thirty
merchantmen was sent to England with the mas t valuable part ot
the spoils, Wlder convoy of Commodore Hotham.

A french admiral,

LaMothe Piquet, attacked the convoy about twenty leagues west of
Sci11y Islands.

Hotham ordered the convoy to disperse and save

themselves and the warships to draw

oloa....

The French, instead

•

51

~.,

706.707.

52 Ibid., 707. Although Lord North's majority might
stop a Parliamentary inquiry, it could not halt legal proceedines.
There appeared in the courts no less than sixty-tour claims,
amounting to more than the value of the property. Rodney was
put to a great deal of expense. The books and papers could not
be found. In the six years follOwing the capture only thirteen
cases were settled and judgments of restitution were handed
down in nine of these cases. Because the King had granted all
ot the spoils to the captors, Rodney and Vaughn should each have
received a sixteenth of the spoils. Vaughn, however, told the
House ot Commons that he had made nothing by the transaction.
and Rodney did no better. They made conflicting arrangements
which angered their captains and retarded the settlement.

of fighting, made after the convoy and captured twenty-six of
them.

The warships and only eip-)1t of the merchnntsships suc-

ceeded in reachine Berehaven Bay.53
St. Eustatius was taken by the French before the end of
the year.

The chief French merchant of the island and Marquis

de Bouille plarmed the recapture of the island.

At an Wlguarded

part of the coast, the marquis, governor oi Martinique, landed a
force of fourteen hundred men and quickly overcame the six hundred and twenty-eight men commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cock-

burn.

In 1783 it was brought out at Cockburn's trial that, al-

though he had been offered reeintorcements, he had refused them;
and, even though he had been warned of the French attack two
days before, he had ignored the information.

Rodney's money,

instead of being sent to England, was confiscated and detained
because of the mismanagement of his agents.

Jameson sums up

Rodney's career in these words:
The conquest on which he had prided himself as tthe greatest
blow that Holland and America ever received' ended in disappointment and vexation for him,-reversal and odium for his
cOWltry. But it was left for him, by the memorable victory

53 Ib~!., 707-708. Jameson and Randolph G. Adan~,
"A View of'CornwQ lis's Surrender at Yorktown," Aro@ricgn H1§toricat Revilri' New York, 1915, 33, disagree on the number of ships
sent by . odney to En,sland. Since Adams's article is based on
Rodneyls own record, we have used his figures.
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of thE) twelf.th of APril.. 1782 t to show that» despite m1stakee
of public policy and £!!itlts 01- private character, he possessed a prOfE'3Ssional greatness that cQ..y,ld lift n1s narne to
beight ot e10ry as a naval commander. ,_

The story ot St. l;uetatiua has beell told in some detail

Ibeclluse its contribution to the success ot the Battle o£ Yorktown
_eems to wnrrnnt it.

It

~onquest.

would have intercepted tho French fleet.

<

~1thout

he

prot),'~bly

ILodnoy had not been occupied with his

the support ot this fleat t'lllshington could never have baon

~uccessrul

in his siege ot l'orlctoWll.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF THE FREI'iCH 'JEST INDIES IN DETmUUHING

'REHCB POLICY, 1775-1781
Haiti, too, played an important part in the Revolutionary \i,:ar. .The tear of losing it and other islands in tl"e West

Indies helped to brine France into the war as an ally ot the revolting colonies.

It was through Haiti that French aid came to

the r\meri cans.

The history ot Santo Domingo and Haiti has been greatly
influenced by geography and climate.
~us

discovered the islend during his first voyage and named it

Hispaniola.
~and. 1.
~ean

On December 6, 1492, Oolum-

Except for Cuba, Haiti. the western end of this 1s-

closer to the United States than any other 0.£ the Carlb-

lands.

Mole St. Nioolas 11 located on a peninsula tihleh jut.

out into the Windward Passage, one ot the most important ot the

world's trade route..

Permanentrealdence by white men haa been

made difficult because ot its tropical climate. However, it has
been made a leading producer ot subtropical products because ot
that same climate..

The importation of slave laborers, used by
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the white colonial settlers to exploit its resources, was to make
the history of this part of the islanddirterent from any other
uropean colony.l
The tirst permanent settlements were made in the southeastern part of the island.

Englishmen. Frenchmen, Spaniards,

d others fought for land and booty in the western third, Haiti,
ich soon became an international frontier.

Slowly the French

irates gained enough control to have Spain. by the Troaty of
,

yswick in

,

1697, recognize Prench sovereign1ty over a vaguely

efined western third.

For the sake of clarity and accuracy, th1s

study will refer to the part controlled by France as Saint Domin-

In the trade wars ot the mercnntil1stic a,;e Saint Domine gradually became the prize possession.
Ossun. in a memoir dated

Febr~~y

10,

The Yrench mini.ster to

1174, declared: "It

Domingue) is the finest and tichest colony that remains to
the inconsiderable losses that they sustained in
America; and it is their principal resource for t.he maintenance
f a navy that becomes more necessary every day to counterbalance

he formidable power of the English. ft 2

2

~.,

2.

to Ulustrate the
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importance of this trade, Logan states;

o

On the eve of the French Revolution Saint Domingue ex.
ported to Franee commodities valued at two hundred and five
millions of livres in the currenOJ' of Saint Domingue and
imported trom France articles valued at'sixty-nine millions.

In this lucrative trade were employed 1,282 ships ot three

hundred and 8ixty-~ee thousand tons, manned by fifteen

thousa.'1d sailora. In addition, trade between the colony
and the United States had become so important tp~t many
French chambers of COtmllerCe were protesting aeainst it • .3
If Saint Domingue were threatened t Spain would also be
concerned since she was bound by the Family Compact to come to thE
~id of France in case of war, nnd was to share any losses which

lIrould occur e.$ a result of war.

Spaints L-nmense Amol"ican empire,

lincluding Santo Domingo on the same island as Sa.int Doraingue.
pfi:ered a strong temptation to the enemy t who wou1_d proba.bly be

Ox-ea.t Britain, if Spain went to war to support Frar!ce. 4

British'policy in the Caribbean encouraged this fear of
~ possible British attack on Saint Dom1ngt.:us.

Having taken Jamaica

JJl 1655, the British sought to captur~ Hispaniola under Crolnwell.
nstl"uctlons were sent to the Britian

gov61~llor

of JWfla1ca. during

he \lar ot the Spaniah Succession to encourage Santo Domingo to
~ive the Frenell out of Sa.int Dorn1ngue.

The captur'e

ot St. Louis

n the southern coast, in l748, was the only British attempt at

:3

~.,

4 ;tRig..

2-3.

4,-,.

after the French had a.cquired possession of their part

~"::SiOll

pi the island.· However, British diplomacy gave serious considera~ion to Sa.int Domingue throug;hout the eiehteenth century.;
~arly

as 1738 some British statesmen began to realize the imP01"t-

ance of the Wind\v-ard
~ritish

Pass&t~e,

bet\1Sen Cuba and Sai.i. t Domingue. to

commerce with Jamaica and Portobelo.

~ighteenth

By the end of the

century Mole St. Nicolas came to be called the "Gib...

rnltC.J:" of the Caribbean."
~he

As

Finally. SUBer from Sa.int Domingue was

principal competitor with that commodity from the British

BUCi.Lr islands.

By the end of the Seven Year t s viar there was a

"trong tradition in the French foreign office that in future wars

. . he Brit1eh would surely attack Saint Domingue. 6
This island became a troublesome region l'lhich British,
Spanish, and French would have t.o consider carefully in their war

plans.

It was more than a potential danger spot to the Thirteen

Colonies.

It was a source of impCll"'tant trade.

The contacts between the English colonies in North
lmeri cs and Saint DOmingue began when William Phip$ recovered a

pirate treasure otf the coast of the island as early as 1686-1687.

In 1'717 the French govermnent, l"'ccotPlizing their comm()ricaJ. l..t').ter-

dependance, and in spite of the mercantilistic theory, authol"'i6ed
a tl"ade that consisted largely ot an e.xcheJlge of

N~\1

England fish

tor molasses from Saint DOtid.ngue. 7 Soon thEU",3 were sixty-tl1ree
distilleriee in the Massachu.setts Colony alonl, for the mallut<S.cture of molasses into rum.

D"'ur1ng the next ten years t~:~e rJ04:'th

Americans had $!1ugt;led so :nany unauthorized articles into Suint

DO::J.il<.:ue ttlE.t Fra.nce cOPlplained to Great Britain.

By the Molasse.

IAct of 1733 the British hoped to levy such high duties on molneses

Irro!:: the French "lest Indies that the colonists
IProfitable to trade with the British islande. g
~ov.ntri {?'$
~rade

\-TO

The

d find it more
t\'10

mother

could not put a stop to the amuer.11ng and contre,band

even 'When they

~'cre

at war because both the dil'ect and tri ...

P-ncu.1ar trade had rcaded such proportions.

The attention of the three comnlercial pOiscrs and of the
~irteen Oolonies wns focused upon Sn1~t Domingue at the outbreak

p! the American Revolution.

jn

order to prevent an. attack on

~nir:lt Domingue and at.her French possessions, many CO[1petent h1ator-ians conclude. France secretly Etided the colonies end eventually

l~ttsJ

7 Samuel· I. Morison, lbi t'lKilCiM Hil1io[Y 9l. l-li@IICbijBoaton, 1921, 19.

e

Pares.

1E. .f!Wi Tta9a

.m l£lul ~ ,nsl&el,

1739-176 )>>

s:i.,g;ned the Treaty of Al1:f.a."1ce, a.l1,d a Treaty of Amity and Trade of
177!~ vJ'ith the United States. 9 This point is disputed, howe\"e~. ~
by equn.lly cmppetent historlans.

L.eti us exu.'11:i.ne, first. the 0PPOILo;~m' sconclusione

1ne poin'ts of view i,n the controversy; second.

bnsed on

nEhl

,

mat€lrials; t4"1d third. the e.xtent of aid through

Salnt Domingue.

10

Van 'lYtle

o£fc);~$

evidence to eOO1;{ trlG.t Fr,'.nce aided the

col'Juies and aiti.T,ed t.he alliance 'i;dth the United 3t.::.tes

bec~;..u:f;e

As early as

of fear of an, t.tte.ck on the French lJest Indies.

1.76!",) some colonists want ('d to conquer Saint Dominque as an out ...
let for their produ.cts I accox'tiing to Po,ntlcToy,
l.r. the Am€~rj.can colonies.

9.

French observer

In 1763, another' French Ob::$f::ryer, De

Kalb, "'JaS conv:i.nced that the Arnericru1 Colonies would join thE;
n

d

$

9

'Lora~ The

P1:o1omat1c

iD.4. H,eJtci, AZZ6-.l,bl. ;"1.

I.!,~lat~o.£A

.Ql t}1C t:nit,qp.

e~9r1t,§1

10 Sources consulted tor this dispute include:
Samuel FlaCG' Bemes l :.t'hf(. D&n&o!'Z\t'lCV .2t t,11£ AIDeticm
Revolutlgl1. 11ew York, 19J5, ·19-20.
Edward S,* Corwin. [LeUgh PolicX
~lignC6

of

~.

.m.u!

~

ger&;.

Princeton, 1916.

Edward 5. Corwin, "TriO French' Objective in the Amer can Revolution, If A!ner!cN.\ H&lxQ£&S;&1, Heviax, New York, 1916, XXI,

33-62.

Clau,de H. Van Tyne, Iflntluences Which Determined
the French Government to Make the Treaty with America in 1778,"
Amel'lc§Jl !I~,tor1ceJ· i~Itm:h New York, 1916, XXI, 52$-541.

Iilothc,l;' country in an c1',t'ort to capture the

li'l--{'!nch ~est

Indies

should France attack Great Britain.iergennss, l''reneh minister

of

4

ft1l

sign affairs, and Louis XVI recorded their fears of a

I3ritish attack on the l"l'ench ~iest Inc!ies.

Caron de Jeat:.marchais,

whose z'ole in aiding thE:~ colonies will be; discussed later, either
on hia own initiative or prompted by Arthur l.oe, an ;\.merican
if~~e

ageut, ill l'175 began to :nag Vergelmes vlth this refrain:

ww;t. aid tLc Americans or they wd.ll be reconciled with ili'eat
I3~.'itain and att&ck the French ~",€st Indies. ttll

The

.:i,l;';'if;.;>::£tcd. by the;: L:in1~tet' of l1:·us:.;ia to F'l'ance.

,i:WJlle

idea was

Lord Stol"'mont,

th.e British ambascadol" to li'rance, was told by VCl gel1lA.eS in Au1

bust of 1777; nyour pt.;,blic p~pcrs. your pw~p,hlGteers, YOl:X
Ol~a:tors and ours. 4."'epc~t cea.scleasly that if you de not I'egain

your color:.it:~s J you \-dll fall l.lpon OlJ.r03. ,,12

In ord~r to prevent reconcilliation and jl')int attack on

tho l;'rencc possessions in the Caribberm. Vergennes pushed the
A.'nerican al11anc(;

a!tCl'

tr~ Briti$h considered a peace offe!' to

the colonies follo'td.nf; the battle of Saratoga.

The Anwrican

ao·n::.te in Paris w{;:ce rCi;ortcdly carrying on secret :.tegotiations

~ H§iti.

11 .Lopan" ~ liicpl2Mt&e Ba1AAiQDI

1'Z26-.a2.,T.
12 I1215!., s.

.

9J:

the Uni1(iQ States
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\'1ith British agents.

The Americans cleverly kept the fires burn-

ing under Vergennes.

The French foreign minister wrote to Ossun.

the ambassador to Spain on December 27, 1777;

"The question whidl

we may have to solve is to know whether it is more expedient to

ba.ve war aeainst England and America unit.ed, or w:i.th AT/lerlea for

us aga1aat England."l) Van Tyne observes that Vergennes and
other 1rench statesmen recog;nized in the American Revolution an
opportunity to weaken Great Britain and restore France to a dom!.
nant position in world affaireh

However. he 18 convinced t.hat

France aided the colonies and signed the alliance with the United
States 1n order to prevent a.n att,ack on the French West Indles. 14

On the other hand, Corwin, largely on the same evIdence
consulted by Van Tyne, entirely rejects the latter's conclusions.
lie points out that Vergennes in order to win unw111inB statesmen

to b.:\a vi ewe would naturally use the argument of tear.

Corwin

further states that Great Britain had not attacked French and

Spanish pesseasions in 1715 when the fleets ot Brance and Spain
were weak.

Since the Bourbon fleets were ready in 1778, why

should they tear a British attack?

In 1115 the British opposi-

tion headed by Chatham had threatened the attack.

-

13 !1l!!l.
14

rug.

Vergennes

argued that the danger came from the government of Lord North in

17"/8.

In 1775 Vergennes ar€:~ed that the bait of a joint attack

on the French West Indies might have deterred the Arllerican colonists f"".t'om revolution.

In 1778 the argument had

COf,H~

to rest on

the danger of the reconcUiation of the United Stntea and Great
Britain.

Corwin wonders if the Ar.lericans would have accepted the

opportunity tor spoils in
complete independenc'e.

1171-1778 1t

Great Britain did not oft~

Probably not, and. in Corwin's op1n!on,

Great Britain was not ready to otfer complete independence at
that time.

From reports sent by Noailles, the French ambassador

to London, Vergennes knew that there was little likelihood of a
settlement.

Moreover, Vergennes insisted that the Spanish

Indies were in graver danger than were the French.
cludes that Vergennes's

COnCel"ll

'~ie8t

Corwin con-

"was not, primarily, the security

ot the West Indies_ttl)
Some or Corwin's arguments are open to criticism.

An

at tack on the F'rench West Indies could have been good bait to
prevent the revolution in 1775 and would have been equally good

bait to bring about a reoonciliation in 1778.

Second, it was not

at all strange to see the arguments formerly advanced by the opposition adopted by the party in power.

-
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In the opinion of those who support the Corwin theory.

eOl1clusi ve argument 't.Jas the fact that Vergennes knew

ere was no danger of a British attack in 1777.

Arter the

tailt!ro ot Forth, a seoret British ar:ent, Lord Stormont, on September 2, 1777, offered to VergenneS a guarantee that i.f France
did not s£.nd troop. to her West Indies, Great Britain \iould not

,end troops to her Caribbean possessions.

Corwin rails to record.

the reaction of French statesmen to this proposal.

Maurepas and

Louis XVI agreed with Vergennes tr~t this proposal could not be

accepted. ' Stormont could not hide his disappointment at not bein
able to get an agreement that Wltld ha.v~ given his court an ad-

vantage over the French which they would certainly have abused,
hen he received the !trench refusal..

Vergennes alao told Storaoa

,.:

that, 1£ she wanted

tOt

Great Britain could send shipe and troops

. ).,;..."'

to th'fi';'iWest Indies but, he, recommended, they shOUld stay out of

the waters of the French colonies.

On September 6. 1771, Ver..,.

gennas wrote Noal11as that France :intended to exercise her right

to send troops to the French

~est

Indies tor defensive purposes

only. 16

Two weeke later in a letter written to Ossun, Vergennes
passed judgment upon the BrItish course of action.

According to

Vergennes, the British were really tryine to intimidate France

-

80
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that they could prove to the Americans that they could not rely

upon France in a time of crisis.

lie instructed Nos1lles in

rather warlike tones to inform Weymouth that the French fleet
would leave tor the French

~~est

recognized Great Britain's

ri~lt

fleet in proportions.

Statesmen

Indies in about a weok.

France

to increase her West Indies

or

the eighteenth century did

not place faith in the official assurances of a rival nation.

he rUld

~ccepted

the pledge

or

1£

any other nation at face value.

Vergennes would have very naive indeed. 1 ?
Logan has examined t:118 question at some length because
it has been

history.

It

Olle

ot the major controvDrsles in Amer-ic.'Ul diplomat.ic

l'10cld

seem that later American historians have sup...

ported the Corwin theory.
some new materials which,

He has reopened the case because of
combim~d

with his

m~1'l

reading of th~

twc

pr:l.llcipal sources used by other writers. shed new light on the
problem but which do not completely solve it.

The new materials used by Lor,an are, fir3t, the

ne~otla.

ttons between France and Spain to settle the boundary between
Saint Domingue and Santo Domingo and certain difficulties which
arose during the period 1770-1771; second, t.he correspondence

17 Ibip., 10.
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bct','iOC?n

S~_iL t

Vercennes a'1d Count DtEnnery, the

JominClc 1.n 1775 and 1776.

In AU,:ust, 1773,
rm:'eiL~

g()~lernor-r,;eneral

or

18

ntl\1~~tdllon,

at tht'!.t tiMe the French

minister, wrote to Ossun that FJ:'>ance had to e:cercise

pn.:cttcular

~are

in

p1).ttin~=

Saint DorZ!inG'1lG in n. state

in Ci.::.se of vu?:x with Great Britain.

o.r: defense

He did net say 'tvhy war migh.t

BCCat~le

French m.ilitary

(~Xpert8

celiille as a necessaI',r pl"'Gcaution. a.;airist possible 3I'itish At tack
In Februa."l, 1174, he declared that. it.
for Fcance to pass

i''::'Oril

of a Bl."itiah attack.

a.bsolutely necessary

une anti oi.' the isl&tld to t;.he othtJ!'

Bl~:l.tiah

hands wit.hout JTl'cnch

H.e argued that. since the British attack had

dur'ingthe Seven Years' iiar I the pz'oJect 'Would
be l.'anewed.

houses

to

ill caSE

He also suggestcJd that the !;,l.k.iliish part of

the island w()"l.ud surely fall into

aid.

~as

be~n

m01'0

planned.

tihan likely

It. therefore .. became lleceseury for thQ two Bourbon

settle their difficulties in the ialand. 19

18

1,91..9,_, lO-U.

19

It!19..

ll.
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fear.' of

H.

Bt'lt:lsh attacl:

h11Em

he told VerGennos thnt

plenty or tiutG to prepare for one.

Dc

A::,"~::.n(b.

ta:m:tted

n()W'~nrer.

for J... ouiaiana to the partition of roland in 1772.

no inccllvenience in pe!'!:1ittiug Frunch troops to pass
0:'

key {;.t"' her

of the Dcvcn:l

ontended tiAktt.. since Frauce was only
gricu.ltw'e.

e~rt,.,ensive fOl·t.i£icut~.ona

inter~sted

in

CO~i!l;.":;.cce

poauession of Fort Daupltin by t..he

Ja.r~uary

F'~"ench W&3

and

In case ot

'Wtlre n.ot neeu.t.d.

\A:'eat Britain. VerGGnnes io.aiated, on

ecessary.

a lir!. tioh

10. 1775,
absolutely

However, it. seems cleal'" t.hat he was thinking only of

eventual war.

Vergennes' desire to keep the kno.iledge of Sourfrom Great Britain may have been the ri.;sult of

rather the>l1 an imrnediate attack by
Caribbean.
lji:lt}

th~

LoJ9,1.n sums up this correspondence in

&"itish in
thi~

llay:

whole, this oorrespondence lett the irnpresoion that there

no real alnrm. on the pa.;a;"t of either France or Spain.
the documents

sU.Et;~e3t

Ind.eod,

ratiher that both side. were willing to
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resort to any argUl'l'umt in order to obtain the best boundary possible ."20

On t.he othr-x hand, in Vergennes' letter to Osaun, dated
Febru-::try 14, 1775, there is a ccmvincin,g note of" sincerit.y.

over, it is Ver::;ennes t first reference to the
the Tl.irteen Colonies.

c~,:'!lin~

~:!()re ..

revolution ill

Because of their diffic'..uties \'lith the

colonies, the British, in Vergennes' opinion. would hardly urge
the ;Portuguesc to cause trouble for Spain in the Rio de 1a Platte

region.

Then he concludes:

But the more their embarrassment increases and compels them
to undertake seri OtiS 'YleaSU.l"'0S, +;he L!OrE.: it is necessary for
us and tor Spain to take precautions so that tihe counterblow

~l~o~o!,. ~~~~t U:~r~1 (~~ ~e t;~~s\~;~~ ~~~~~j~i1:jrJ,c~t o;~1e!s
~~~U~iri~:u.;h~d In!~~l t~~r~~!:~th. scndin;; to

A::leric;" such

The expression, fiI am not wi tbout worry, tt seems to be
the best statement of the attitu.de

during the next twenty-two months.

ot both Vergennes and DtEnnery
On June 23, 1775, Vergennes

wrote to the FrE"-Och ambassador in London that the British might
be tempted by the French possessi ,n in the Caribbean and that the
French might have to reenforce her colonial garrisons i f the
British increased their £leet to America.

However, only three

battalions were sent to Saint Domin[;Ue and three to f4artin1que in

20

Ibig., 12.

21

~.
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september of that year.

DtEunery, in replying to a missing; dis-

pa.tch of September 22, further expressed this anx.iety when he
described the sad state of tr..c colony's defenses t'litll

~l)ccial

refCl"enee to tho lack of ammunition, powdor, and ril'les.
011

However

October 27. J.715, Vergellnes \.irote a long dispatch to DfEnnery

in which no reference was made to the sit.uation in the Thirteen
Colonies..

A letter from the 17rench charge d t atfai;res ill Londou

writ ten in October at&ting that the French. l.'est Indieu need not

tear a British attack may have prompted this silence.
to a lettor

on NL~ch 28. 1776, DtEnn~ry stutes that only

Wl"'i tten

an enormous sum of
a.ttack. 22

According

f:lOney

An analysis of

\,lould make Saint Domillgue secure against

t\IO

treaties signed by Dt Ennery and

Count de Solano, the governor of Santo Domingo, on February 29,
,

1776, supports this attitude of i:m:xiety rather than panic.

Arti-

cle X of the bOWldary treaty provided tor the passage of French

and Spanish troops through each other's colony.

Article II uf'

th~

treaty for policing the frontier provided I
In case of war or unexpected attack on one of' the two parts
of '.:.ne (;olony 7t.l~{,~ aGtion chat, is :-;,,::>t at;,,:3,;:;ke,i '~lill f'UJ:>:ulsh
to the othtn~ all the help possi~e in men, money. arms,
arr11'JUllition, tknd

22

~la~~.,

3t~pplifJ$.

1).

• • •
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the coP-

Df Jtate whi eli considered tht:s€ trcut.ies did not hlake any refer~nce

to:"'b.e value of the pe;;'milSsioll tlo pass thl'Ouch. ~~auto Doraingo.

one :niGht thinl.. that this sil!;;l1cC

r.Cl·C \'lUS

no roa1 dar4:';c;J,;' of

ii.

&i tish at.tucl;:.

til
nothin,::' to
they

.:.u'(;

rJC

On

~:ay

thir4~

19, 11'16,
,.u.> you do;

fe<:l..ccd at. tLis :;lOment on the: part of the

IJ.\lch too occupie:J. ";'itLtbair colonies. "24

How-

goes un:

It would be necessu1"'¥ to hi.: in sor:te :J(:<:i~J u.re of ~oi'cna€ tCl'€!;
if they (the British) believe that \\9 C::.ro c,ble to defend cursel ves. c';3rt.ainly thny '\:i'Q\).J.d a1~'tc.::lI)t notL:in;:;; it is only the
ease with \\~L:t C~1 an e:;.'pedition could be ;;l,adc Hnd the uaSil.rance
of success that l'.'C'Juld tempt thorn. It would, theref~~e, b&
very wis.e 1jO prevent allY e.riort sin ce we havE.~ ti:'ue.~'

24

25

~1?lJ.
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nlis same attitude of "watchful waiting" prevailed even
atter the French
decided to aid the colonies secretly.
.
.

D'Ennery,

on June 15. 1776, was instructed by Vergennes not to leave on

his planned vacation "until calmer circumstances dispel all the
anxieties against which it is very difficult to defend ourselves.-26 He believed the British would not cause France any
trouble in her colonies because or the many difficulties with
their own colonies.

Although the safety or the French.

colonle~

might be assured by these difficulties:
It \liIOuld be more prudent, I think, to owe it (the safety)
only to ourselves. That is the doctrine that I preach here,

but you can better establish the necessity (~ar ,.tense).
You are on the ground. We need your advice. (

According to the Corwin theory. one wonders 1£ it was really advice Vergennes wanted or additional arguments with which he could
convince Spain and his ministers of the danger ot a British attack.

In either case, D'Ennery reluctantly agreed to stay at his

post. 28

At the end of AUGUst Vergennes received word ot the
American declaration of independence through the British newspapers.

This news seemed to strengthen h:ts opinion that there

26

~.

Z7

~.

28

IRi~.,

15.
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.as little danger of a British attack.

For example, on August ag

1716, he wrote to D'Ennery that an administrator gifted with his

foresight was reqtdred by the critical situation in America.
1ereennes expressed.the fear that British "despair" mieht "bring
about a catastrophe against which it is wise to be prepared. "29
He felt that the establishment of a number ot posts, held by sma!
detachments, would be enough to hold off a large invading torce
until the deadly weather forced them to withdraw.

Because there

was little danger of a reconciliation oetlfleen the United States

and Great Britain such an invasion was not to be feared immediate
1y.

He also believed that the struggle would be lone and bloody.

Since tear is as powerful an argument as 1s love in politics,

0.8

well as in other matters, Vergennes ha.d f::lore faith in strong
demonstrat1ons. 30
Not even the American deteat on Long Island in the
sumner ot 1776 changed the attitude ot D'Ennery or Vergennes.
Vergennes informed D'Ennery toward the end

or

September that he

could count upon the aid of Solano 1n case of attack and instruct
ed him to ascertain the strength

0, the Spanieh forces on the is\

land.

There were no detailed orders tor planned action.

29

~.

30

lRid •

D'Enna

,",ook the arune attitude as Vergennes, that ls, that the British
~ere too busy elsewhere to attempt an attack on Saint Domingue,

~ut that "it would be more prudent to owe our safety only to our ....

elves." On November 15, 1176, the King's CounCil drew up some
~structions for Admiral du Clmffault de Besn', the commander of

he fleet about to sail for the Caribbean, which coincide perfecty with this attitude.

I.e the British were to attack Saint Domin-

c~e. he was to rush to its assistance with all his forces.

1ovever. he was not to leave the eastern Caribbean if he did not

eeeive word of an attack on Saint Domingu~.

These instructions

leveal merely the desire to take elementary precautions against
J~ssible

attack rather than any serious alarm.31
Logan evaluates these documents in this way:

Unfortunately, the failure ot these colonial documents to reveal anything ot value during 1777 prevents us from seeing
more clearly the French policy on the eve of the American
alliance. But the documents already printed by Doniol and
Yela Utrilla show rather convincingly that during most of
that year Vergem18s was trying to prove to the Spanish chiei
secretaries, Grimaldi and Florida Blanca that neither wisdom
nor necessity required the sending of twelve thousand troops
to the Caribbean in order to prevent a British.attack. Indeed. when Vereennes began. atter he had received news of the
American Victory at Saratoga, to drive tor an alliance of the
two countries with the United States, the astute Florida Bl~
ca harped upon France's refusal to accede to his"request as
a pretext tor obstructing the proposed alllance • .,,2

31

~.,

15-16.

32

~••
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In the light of this old and new testimony and these
connlcting interpretations Logan drm'Ts these conclusions:

First, the tradition of a British att:lck upon the French
West Indies at the £1rst favorable moment was so strong in
the FI'ench foreign office that Vergennes and most of the
Council of State expected an-attack in the early days of the
American Revolution. Second. as the struggle revealed each
of the contestants increasingly determined to achieve his
objectives, Vergennes and his advisers aeqaired the conviction that the danger of attack was not imminent. They.
nevertheless. remained. alert~ Third, atter the American
victory at Saratoga, Vergennes either sincerely or cleverly
feal"ed reconciliation and j()int attack. The n6W :llB.tet'!a.ls
do not help us definitely to solve the ridCle. It is evident. however t from the docu.rnents alreaJy

p",bl:tsh~d

that if

he has deceived posterity he also deceived contemporary
Fr~neh statesmen t for Louts XVI. Haurepas. and other melllhers
ot the Council 01- State f and Ossun all agreed with him early
i:1 1778, that there vIas a real da.nger of reconciliation and
joint attack. Fourth, tear ot an attack was not the primary

reason for either French aid or the French alliance

bcca~~e

a possibility 1s bound to be secondary to a certainty. Ther4
could be no doubt that the loss of the l'hirteen Colonies
would greatly weaken Great Britain. There was, on tbe other
hand, only the possibility that Great Britain wou.ld attack
the French West Indies. Even that contingency had to be
guarded aBainst because France would gain little, if while
the n11rteen Colonies were being subtracted fro~the British
scale, France at the cane time lost her remainin[! possessionf
in the Western world. J )
\1hatever influence the French "est Indies had in deter-

mining l"rench policy from 1775 to 17'lg, probably the most entangling permanent comilitment in the history of the United States

"forever from the present time and against all other powers. 1f
According to Article Xl of the Treaty ot Alliance signed an

-

33

~.,
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,ebruary

6, 1778, the United States promised to support France by

military meaaures in detendine the French 1:'est Indies from at-

ta e}c. 34 Some one might think that this guarantee reveals a real

tear on the part ot France of a British attack on her Caribbean
colonies.
'!'he desire to promote commerce between the United
States and France, including the French West Indies, was another
possible reason tor French aid and the alliance.

Logan states

that one writer is ot the opinion that the main reason for French
policy was the desire to increase Franoets commerce lath the
United States.

This interpretation seems a little far-fetched.

As early as September of

or

1776 Vergennes obscured the importance

commerce between the United States and Saint Domingue.

In a

letter to D'Ennery he mentions that France had obtained permissior:
trom Spain to obtain supplies far her west Indian colonies from
certain Spanish colonies, including Louisiana.

However, since

this would not be enough, American help "would be more abundant
and tIore diI'ect. tf

He would recommend.· thoref'oI'c, that tormer

restr"ict1ve measures be relaxed.

He concludes, "our best .fr'iend

18 the one who helps Us to live. tt35
•

Late in December

ot 1776 he

61
expressed the hope to DtEnnery that many American ships would
enrry supplies, timber t and tobacco to Saint Domingue during the
Be5..ng; very optir:dstic, he thought that DtEruwry tJight

tlinter.

obt3.in a surplus from the Americans thr'1t he could send to
Frnnce. 36

It is difficult to deterrnine just

\'lent to Saint Doningue during the l'f.::lr.

LO\I Lluch

"The first

in th e Unitod States," Stephen Girru."d started his

comr~erce

pI'i vats bankel~
enOI'I;)'OUS

for-

tune by tt'ading 'ttith Saint Domin&'Uc during the American H.evolutio
and in the }rears i"lhich followed.

The dependence of these porte

upon foreign tra.de when France was at uar is shown by the opening

of colonial

.

pori~s

to foreign vessels in 1778.

A competent French

d1plo.'1lat, Louis Guillaume Otto. at one tine charge d'u.ffaires in
the United Stntes t c.eclnred in 1197:

In sacrificing so many mE"..n and millions (of francs) to BUStain the Unit.ed States, the Royal Government had in view
l"k"llting the Un.ited States the comple'.lent to our western
colonies by finding 1n the United States at all times provi.s1ona fl'lr our '.'{est Indies or for our "tax·ships.)?
In other wordttJ, in war as

w~11

as in peace, an lndependent Uni.ted

States eould supply Saint Domineue, as well. as other French possessions, with necessnry provisions that British colonies t;ould
be prevented froM do ing.

36
37

!P.1..4.. t
Lb.1.1..

lee

19.

This aI'r;ument was promoted at a time
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~hen

some French statesmen were recommendine a friendly policy

toward the United States in the face of considerable opposition.38
The terms of the Treaty of Amity and Oommerce, signed
on February 6, 1778, show that the desire for comnlerce between
the United States and the Frmch West Indies was only a secondary
consideration.

It granted to Americans the most-favored nation

treatment but confined it to the French ports in Europe.

Althougt

she did not open any new ports, France promised to keep open the
existine free ports in the Caribbean.

The treaty

mote trade between the United States and the
one way.

~est

so~~ht

to pro-

Indies in only

By the terms of the original treaty molasses taken by

the Americans from those islands was exempted from the payment
duty in the United States.

ot

In return, the Americans promised not

to impose an export tax on goods taken by Frenchmen to those
possessions from the United States.

France did not insist upon

these provisions being retained when southern interests and temperance advocates prevented the adoption of these clauses by the
Continental Congress beoause it meant an increase in trade for
the northern states.

Although it does not seem to be the main

reason tor the French desire to help in the founding of an

63

independent United States,

co~aerce

between the United States and

saint Domingue did assume a role of major importance. J9

The opportunity for profits seen by some French friends
of the United States must also be considered as one of the motives behind French policy.

At the same time the importance of

Saint Domingue in the plan ot secret aid may be examined.

The

personal interest of some American officials in transactions conducted through the colony is also indicated.
It was reported by D'Ennery that Americans bought a
lot of powder in Saint Domingue as early as September, 1775.

He

wrote to Vergennes, perhaps facetiously, "You understand how very
difficult it is, even with the best intentions in the world, to
prevent a merchant here from selling his powder to one who is
obscurely the secret agent of some merchant from llew Eneland. ,,40
He also reported that the Dutch purchased powder at Saint Domin-

eue, carried it to the island ot St. Eustatius, and then would

resell it to the American agents bhere.
played in

providin~

The part that island

powder that helped the Americans to keep

fightine has already been told.

However, one can not entirely

discount the powder which came to the United States from Saint

40 Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776,"
American li.i:stQrt;iJ, Rftvtmt, 192 5, XXX, 271-282.

64Domingue either directly or by way of St. Euatatius. 41

The Con-

tinental Coneress took full advantage of the opportunities offeree
by the Caribbean islands
by the Americans.

tor buyine the supplies so

~~dly

needed

On October 13, 1775. the Committee ot the

t1hole passed a resolution wh:.ch recommended that the various
revolutionary assemblies export certain products at their own
risk to the West Indies 1n return tor sal petre, sulphur, ammunition, and arms.

The governor of Saint Domingue was sending muni-

tions to the Americans, Lord Stormont complained.

At the end ot

1775, a French agent in the United States, Bonvouloir, reported
that the Americans wanted to buy supplies in Saint Domingue and
to receive two military engineers by way of that island. 42
The plan by which France sent aid to the Americans
through Saint Domingue developed in the brilliant mind ot Caron
de Beaumarchais.

His love affair with the beautiful Pauline de

Breton gave Beaumarchais a romantic interest in Saint DominGUe.
As u result of investments he had made there. he also had a finan-

cial interest.

41

.and

\vhen he wrote his trunous memoir, "Peace or War,"
Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the American Revo1ution,fi

·42 Logan, D1plomat1~ RelatioQ! ~ ~ UD6ted StQt2§
HAiti, 20.
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'Which helped to form the ideas already in tho mind of Vergennes,
he mig,ht have had Saint Domingue in mind.

At about the same

time a confidential memorandum which Baaumarchais submitted to
the king proposed the torllk'ltion of a comrlH:)rciul house. Roderique
Hortalez and Company, to handle the secret French aid.

They

could be absolutely sure of the transportation of munitions to

Cap FranCOis, which had been chosen as the first port ot deposit
in America, it they used French vessels. 4 J

Using 1ntonnation

given him by Beaumarchais, Arthur Lee, in the sprin~ of 1776,
wrote from London to the Secret Commit tee ot Congress that France
was ready to send five millions of livres worth of an~unition and
arms to Cap 1"roocoi8 from where it would be sent to the colonies.
In his RetJ.ets;~onl or April, 1776, Vergennes suggested:

The colonists would send to our ports their ships lade.n with
goods and take in return arms and ammunitions, paying the
difference not in currency t but in goods delivered to either
Saint Domineue or to one or our European ports.44
It became evident that the Americans would be expected to aid
the French colony in return tor aid sent to them through. Saint

Domingue.

PHe

43· l'Ja Deille
m • Col,lectiw,! 2l ~
Soctetv, New York, 1 7, XIX, 106-113.
44 Logan. Diplgmattc fStlition§
Haiti, 21.
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Briefly summarized, the following are the propositions
of the French government to give secret aid to the American
colonies:
The aspect of a speculation of an individual to which
the French government were strangers, was to be maintained throughout.
To aRRest 80, it must be la, up to a certain point.
The French government would eive one million francs.
It would influence Spain to give an equal sum.
Beaumarchais would ask other parties to subscribe to
his enterprise.
Beaumarchais would establish a large cODmlercial house,
and, at hls own risk and peril, he could supply America
with arms, ammunition, etc.
The French arsenals would deliver to this company arms
and ammunition to be replaced or paid for.
Beaumarchais and h.i..8 company were not to demand money
of the Americana, but produce of their soil; such pay
was to be distributed throughout the kingdom and the
enterprise would become self-supporting.
9. The French government was to reserve the right to favor
or oppose the company. accordine to political contingencies.
10. Beaumarchais was to render to the French government an
account of the proi1ts and losses of the enterprise.
11. The French government was to decide whether to [~ant new
contributions or discharge tl~ company from all obligations previously sanctioned. 4 ;

1.

Thie plan will be discussed more fully later in this
study.
Only exhaustive research could establish just how much

aid went to the Americans by way of Saint Domingue.

Two British

•

45 Blnnche !:vans Hazard, 'Beawnarcl\.a.is
Revolutiqn. Boston, 1910, 19-20.

.iW1

the Americ911
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t.rigates stationed orf Mole St, Nicolas early on 1776 hindered
trade relations.
powde:c 7_\1

The British protested against the sale of

Saint DOmingue to the Americans in June.

Four months

later Vereennss wrote D'Ennery that the contraband trade between
the cr:: '1'.S and the United States was probably not as great as

Stormont thought it to be.

Nevertheless. he recammended that the

contraband trade be completely stopped in order to convince Great
Britain of the French desire to stay on friendly terms with her~6
Vergennes and Beaumarcha1s were perfecting their plan
of secret aid beneath this cloak ot friendship.

The first ship

of Hortales and Company did not set sail tor the United States
by way

of Saint Domingue Wltil the end of the year.

In Deceaber

AmRh1tr'~i

was ready to

Beaumarchais informed Vergennes that the

carry a regiment of Irish soldiers and supplies to the United
States.

Since }t"'rance had the right to send reenforcements and

supplies to her own colony, the ship's papers were to show that
the entire consignment was for D'Ennery.

Beaumarchais kept

Carabas. one ot his at~ents, in Saint Domingue in order to super-

vise the operations there.

Vergennes was notified by Beaumarchais

on July 1, 1777, that the cargo of the Amllie, having reached

-

68

saint Domingue, was already on the wa.y to the United States in
several American sh ips.

Beaumarchais wrote to France, his agent

in the United States. on December 20,

1777, that a vessel con-

taining more than one hundred cannon and uniforms for the American soldiers was beinG sent to Saint Domingue.

"ere to lie off Cap Francais.

The American ship.

They were to hoist the Dutch flag

to the main mast and fire five shots after gi vine the preliminary
signal.

Then the French ship was to go out and allow itself to

be captured and taken into an American port where, after a trial,

In the meantime the Americans would have

it was to be released.

had the cargo turned over to then. 47
The Americans were acti ve in the meanwhile.

\l/illiam

Binr,ham, the first purchasine aeent in the Caribbean, went out

to I.1artinique where he played an important part in sending sup-

plies to the United States.

Kichnrd Harrison was sent in a simi-

lar capacity to Cap Francais, Silas Deane was informed by Richard
~orris

on Aur,ust

11, 1775. However, there is no evidence that he

~ul.filled his mission.

Norris sug,gested to Deane that they en-

gage in a little private business for themselves through Saint
Domineue at the same time.

In another letter written a month

later lJiorris states that the American purchasing agents were
~tephen Ceronio and Jolm

47

loW.,

22.

Dupuy_

Deane was instructed that, since
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they 'tlare the safest routes, he 'Was to continue sf'.nding supplies
by way of ?lIartinique and Saint Doming;ue.
by Deane in January,

Domingue.

The French were ureed

1777, to speed up shipments

by way of Saint

Nicholas Rogers, an American agent at Port-au-Prince,

three months later informed Deane that eleven American ships were
at the Cap and that five or six had just left tor the United

states.

At the end ot June,

1777, the shiP. k§ #2cOO. in which

orris and Deane had an interest ot one hundred thousand livres,
rived safely at Charleston, South Carolina, by way of Saint
A Captain Lundaie was advised by Deane to go to the
nited States by way of the colony in September.

Any artillery

fficers which mi~pt be with h1m were to be disguised as sailors
r passengers for Saint Domingue.

A few days later, Deane, wr1t-

nr; to the Committee on Forei~ Affairs, expressed the hope that

.

8

There§e, a ship he had sent by that route, had arrived. 4

One must be very cautius in any statement as to the
of the aid that the United States received through Saint
mingue.

Ships did not always reach their ultimate destination
they landed in the island.

For instance, in

1779

anklin informed the Continental Congress that the supplies trom
wo large ships were still in Saint Dominr;ue although they had
rived there many months before.

fievertheless, it is certain
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that the aid sent before and after the alliance was considerabl~49
Some of the foreign volunteers used Saint Domingue as a
means of assuring sate passage to the United States.

Among the

first was Voidke, a Prussian. who later attained the rank ot

brigadier general, and participated in

~le

siege of Quebec, who

passed through the colony in the fall of 1775 with a passport
from Vergennes authorizing him to join the Americans.

General du

portall, who served as chief ot engineers at Valley Farge during
that fateful winter and \\ho built the delenses that saved \,iashing...
ton's army, came to Philadelphia by way of Saint Domingue.

Kalb, Lafayette, and their comrades an the

~

De

V'SM
21£! falsely

swore to port authorities at Bordeaux in Mru:'ch, 1777, that they

~ere going to Saint Domingue • .50
SaiD. t Domingue was not the scene of any important

military or naval operations before the French alliance.

The

Continental Congress appointed a committee to arrange with Bajeu
Laporte, a Frenchman, the terms ot

EX Cal tract

far raising a regi-

ment of French soldiers in Saint Domineue and Martinique on
~~ay

9, 1777.

The records tail to show whether the contract was

49

~.,

23-24.

50

~.,

24.
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e~acutod.

51 'l'he Gontinon:tn.l brig, "ctQUgtQll.

tho Caribbean, but

l'laG

n cruise to

capturer! on ita return from Cap Francais.52

1:»:~1V'ateel"s eOfI1I1isaioned by

nost of the

!;1Uc1e

the lU:lEll·ict:ms confined

th~31r activ1t:tes to the eaat;Cl'n end of' thE' COl"1bboan • .53

r'toat of tho navnl enr;aceoents. aVel} atter t.he i11'"ench

wax', took k-"llacc

ent(JrtHl the

Saint Dooingue became the

i., t..l-to aastf::rn oM

ht,UJO

or

ot

tho Caribuc£u1. 5

operations when tho L?l"'onoh

anted to join the Amtu."1cl.UlS in nav£u Ol·f:lilitr:u....Y operations.

17"l? i\drniral D'7.staint1 salled f"ot}
S:.rV'annah.

th~u"(;}

In

for tLc ntt.ack on

About 91.",< hUlldl~e\l coloro(l Bud iJer;l"O tz'oops trom L)aint

Do!;i.1.ngue p;:.1rticlpot,ed in this attuck.

in coverinj1

too

'.11eY ti1splaytnl conap.iouous

retl'"eat of the

!I~roneh

nnd. Araeric..:Ul forcGS

bruve, but c'u'sorganiaod attaok that had. all'>ondy been
cvoalod in ndvnnco to tbo Bl""i tisb.

l~ven

thou!;} tho attack tailed

ld the }>):oooo11 fleet had toretut"'n tn the Koat Indies, news of
oxpedition forced the British t-o ahandon Haraca.nsett Buy, in

51

'~jorthington

Chauncey FOl"'d. e,.11tor,

p.:o::I~w.Ii_~ ~ili. ~JQ8hinf;tonf

altlWJliM Jat .1£la
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l\odneyfs opinion, "the best and noblest harbor in America.,,55
It may be that the yearnine for their own liberty in the minds ot
the more intelligent Negroes and mulattoes like Christophe and
f,jartial Besse was aroused by the experience ot fighting for the
independence ot others.

On August 5, 1781, the French neet sailed from Cap
Francais under Admiral de Grasse.

Through its viotory in Lynn-

haven Bay, the actual fighting, as tar as the Americans were
concerned, was brought to a close with the surrender of Cornwalli

ot the French neat deteated by Rodney
in the Battle ot the Saints on April 9, 1782, was assembled at

at Yorktown.

Cap Francais.

A large part

The Windward Passage was closely watched by Rodney

to the end of the war.

The necessity of guarding the merchant

fleet from Saint Domingue from the danger of a British attack
lUlited the French naval assistance to the United States.

This

possible British attack caused great tear among French merchants.

Logan has this to say of the part played by Saint

Domingue in the peace negotiations:
AlthouP~ Saint Domingue was not mentioned i~ the treaty ot
peace 5etwecn France and Great Britain, it had been

55 ,bid... U5.
56 Logan, DiRlomat~c llelgtio!}§

d HA:L~i;. 26.
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frequently discussed in the negotiations. One of the
proposals looked to the exchange of Gibraltar by the British
for certain French and Spanish possessions. Some British
planters feared that France, in return for helping Spain
in her efforts to recover Gibraltar, might be given Santo
Domingo. In that event, they contended France with her
alrea.dy vast sugar estates in Saint Domingue would be able
to control the world sugar market. t:hile this fear was not
the only reason for 8ri tain' $ reiusal to relinquish Gibraltar, it indicates a vital interest in Saint Domingue that
will help to clarity British policy dUring the quarter of a
century in which the diplomatic history of the United States
was mo~; closely connected with events in Saint Domin[jUe and
Haiti.

-
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CHAPTEh IV
FRENCH AID TO Tue COLONIES

The aid which France sent to the colonies played a
ajor part in the success of the revolution.
f Alliance was signed in

evolting colonies.

Betore the Treaty

1778, France sent secret help to the

This aid, both secret and official, was sent

o America via the French West Indies.
Confining our attention from the beginning to the quesion of what were the gfficial motives of French intervention, we
ave to consider, in the first place, the Count de Vergennes's
ttempt to represent his program, which eventually became that ot
is government, as essentially defensive.

In his "Considerations"

r 1;!arch, 1776, which led directly to the policy of secret aid to
e Americans, Vergennes urged upon the kine and his associates
e argument that, whether England subdued her rebellious colonies
<

lost them, she would probably attack the French West Indies
o~de{ to use the large forces she would have assembled, and

in order to indermify herself.

In his "Memoire" of July 2.3,

urging an early alliance with the Americans, he took much

74

the same line.

~1e
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policy of secret aid had been well enough in

its day, but it had not secured the Americas for France and Spain.

1£ England could not speedily erush the American revolt, she must
take terms with the colonies.

Those whom she had failed to retain

as subjects she would make allies, in a joint assault upon the
riches of Peru and Mexico and the French Sugar Islands.
There is, to say the least, something of an inconsistency in Vergennes's building an argument for an alliance with the
Americans to protect French interests in the Caribbean upon the
increase of danger resulting to those interests from his own
policy of secret aid.
~ore

striking one.

This inconsistency affords a clue to a yet

In the summer of 1776, when he thought that

,rance could count on the active assistance of Spain, Vergennes
definitely proposed war with England and the proposition was ten~atively

ratified by the King and caUDell.

A little later, how-

ever. came the news of the defeat on Long Island and Vergennes
ibeat a retreat from his own program.

In other words J it would

seem that the danger which, by the argument in "Considerations,ft
would menace France if England should subjugate her rebellious
colonies 'Was one that could be safely awaited in quiet, but toot
"he one threatening from the contrary contingency was one that
tIlUst be met half-way.

Yet it was the latter contingency p,recisely

which the policy of secret aid was designed to make sure.
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Again, a British attack upon the Caribbean possessions
~ould,

of course, have forced France to come to their defense.

It may be gravely doubted whether It"'rench official opinion held
these possessions, after 1763, in suffiCient esteem to have warranted a policy that materially increased the likelihood of a
serious war endangering their own security.

Indeed, Vergennes

himself declared on one occasion that the French West Indies
could offer but slight temptation to English cupidity, that
England already had enough such possessions.

Finally, there is

every reason to believe that both France and Spain could, at any
time betore 177g, have obtained from England, in return for a
pledge ot neutrality, a specific guaranty so long as peace continued on the Continent of Europe.

Ilone the less, Vergennes trom
the first consistently repelled all such proposals. l
Vergennes had been haunted with the bogey from 1776 on,
that, as a result of America's struggle tor independence, France
~d

Spain would lose their West Indian possessions.

It was Beau-

marchais's fine Italian hand that first planted this thorn, which
pever ceased to worry Vergennes until the war was ended.

Thoup)l

1 Edwa.rd S. COrwin, tfThe French Objective in the American Revolution." M9rican Hi,torisa' lleXiew, XXI. 34-.36.
,I
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figaro was only a creature of Beaumarcha.is's fancy, the intriguing
author was a remarkable embodiment of his own imagina.ry hero.
~elt

with comfort in the house of diplomacy, which has been

palled the chosen abode of lies.
~fter

He

On his return from England

his curious adventure with the mysterious Chevalier dtEon,

~eaumarchais

informed the king, by means of a memorial, that he

pad met an Arthur Lee in London, a representative of the Contin~utal

Congress, who had, in its name, offered France, for its
aid, all the advantages of American commerce.

~ecret
~ee

However,

threatened, if France refused, America would send her first

prizes into French ports, and force France either to admit or
"orbid them.
~gland

md a

Forbid, and America would accept peace and

~ioin

with

,in an attack on the French \vest Indies Islands; admit them

rupture with

En~~and

would follow anyway.

Whether Lee or

)eaumarchais invented this striking and terrible dilemma is not
ertain, but the menace of its horns never ceased to worry Ver~ennes.

At least he neVer ceased to pretend to be worried by

hem. 2

2 Claude Van Tyne, "Influences \'1hich Determined the
i'rench Government to P,1a.ke the Treaty with America. in 1778, ff

wer1can H1;atgricM

H.lxta, XXI, 534-535.

Frederick the Great, secret enemy of England, had even
~arlier

planted at the French court a like insidious idea through

his minister in Paris.

He sug.J;ested that France and Spain "had

best reintorce themselves, it (Great Britain) will seize the occasion, after subjugating its colonies, to attack the Spanish and
lFrench po~sessions there.")
~!arch 1,

St. Germain in a'memoir to Vergennes,

1776, declared his belief that when England was through

~th the American struc;gle, whether she won or lost. she would

recoup her losses by seizing the French West India Islands.

"The

ease of conquest would sug;~ost the idea and the excuses are easy

~o find. ,,4 Beauroarchais t s sllt~L';estion had made its instant appeal
~o Vergennests imagination, and in his next memoir to the cabinet,

he dwelt upon it at length, and suggested secret aid and at the
same t 1me preparation for war.

Even Turgot, in his re'flections on

~ergennesfs memoir, thought it likely that it England failed she
~ould wipe out the shame by an attack on Martinique and Porto Rico

~et he suggests that England may be too exhausted financially.

Fo

l1ergennes there was no such hope and for the next eighteen months
his letters are filled with warnin{;;s of thcl.t d.aneer.

He was con-

liinually plying Spain with reasons tor being ready for war, and,

'ii'
Ii
. "
111'·1

'I

II!I'
:' II
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indeed, any time after 1776 he would have plunged France into war
~th England. if Spain would have joined her. S
Spain saw in the American Revolution a possible opportunity for safeguarding her American interests, in weakening the
dominion of the English race through the revolt of the colonies.
spain gave secretly to France one million of the three million

francs handed by the French in 1776 to the American Commissioners.
As the war progressed and the issue was clearly independence,

spain was no longer inclined to help in a movement

a dangerous precedent to her own colonies.

~lich

would be

If successful. it

would build up on her borders a sovereignity in its political
principle very hostile to her traditions, and occupied by a people
whose energy and aggressiveness would be made more formidable by
a successful war.

nlis was the second attitude assumed by Spain

to our Revolution; an attitude of annoyance. of displeasure, of

anxiety, causing her to repel any advance made by us with a sullen
though adroit persistence. 6

Van Tyne mentions many of the rumors which were widespread.

Early in 1775 colonia.l journals spread the tale of forty

'I',

~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
N__
~ __' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _• _ _ _ _ _ _~
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Ships of war building in Sweden for the French government with an
eye to the quarrel between England and America.

In !Itay an imagi-

nary French fleet had put to sea to give aid to American ships.
By fall the papers carried the rumor that France and Spain had a

greater sea force than Britain could muster in a year.

That

superior French and Spanish fleets were in the West Indies.

That

Choiseul was again in favor and would lead France and Spain at
once into war with England.

Algiers was attacked, and Gibraltar

besieged by the Spanish, ran the wild rumors.

By midsummer of

1776 the newspapers deluded Americans with a French general and
an admiral in the \iest Indies ready to begin hostilities against
England as soon as Congress decided upon independence.?
Since French finances seemed to shut out open war,
secret aid was the one solution indicated.

That would brine the

fruits of a great victory without the danger of combat.

Then, to

clinch all other arguments Beaumarchais, after meeting Arthur Lee
in London, audaciously wrote the king:
cans," to save our own West Indies.

"We must aid the Ameri-

Lee had declared that the

Continental Congress had authorized him to demand a treaty of

7 Claude H. Van Tyne, "French Aid Before the Alliance
of 1778, n MarleAU H:i;§tgrical, neviey, XXXI, 34.

~omrJerce

with France in order that America mif:".ht eet from her the

Inunitions of war without which defeat was certain.

Should France

r-efuse, Lee threatened, America. must yield to Eng].and t and then,
~hat
~g

the two parts of the empire might become reconciled by fightside by side, they -would unite in an attack on the French and

~panish
~r

West Indies.

It is impossible to determine whether Lee

Beaumarcha1s invented this amazinr; threat, but it \'ias just the

lIlenace to have the f,reatest effect with the French ministry.

Over

and over again that frightful portent had appeared in reports and

"met:loire" tarllil1ar to every member of the ministry.

esied it in his report in 176$.

St. Germain tl'rice raised the

spectre in his "memoires" to the king.
~uld

DeKal b proph....

"The ease ot conquest

suggest the idea," he wrote, "the exeuses are easy to find."

Pnly thus could Eneland recoup her losses.
~ision.

Turgot. had the same

fearinG most for Martinique and Porto Rico.

Only thus

pould the government hide its shame from the Enr).iah nation.
~eed.

In-

John Adams had intimated as much in the Continental Congress

lihough that could not have been known to the French ministry. 8
A letter without date, published for the first time by
Peorge Clinton Genet in the I~ligaaiM

Slt. Amerisms Hi'xorv, written

i!
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by Beaurnnrcha,ls to the King, gives a clear statement of how he

proposed to proceed in foundinp; this new mercantile house, which
should hide from all the world. and even from the A."11ericnns thern-

eel ~les the conni Viffice of the Government in the operations:
To the King alone:

l<mile stnte reasons engflge you to extend a helpin;.:; hand
to the Americans, policy requires that your I,liajesty shall
take abundant precaution to prevent the secret succor sent to
America from becoming a firebrand between :£I"rance and '8ngland
in Europe. • • • On the other hand, prudence wills that you
acquire a certainty that your funds may never fall into other
hands than those for whom you destined them. Finally, the
present condition of your finances does not permit you to
make so great sacrifice at the moment as passing events seem
to require.

It becomes my duty, Sire, to present to you, and it is
for your wisdom to examine the follo-wing plan, the chief object of which is to avoid, by a turn, which is absolutely
commercial, the suspicion that your },lajesty has any h~md in

the affair.

The principal merit of this plan is to auement your aid
so that a single million. • • will produce the same results
for the Americans as if your Majesty really hud disbursed
nine millions in their favor • • •• Your Majesty will bec:in by placing a million at the disposition of your agent,
who will be named Roderigue Hortales et Cia: this is their
comr::1ercial name t1.nd sienature, under which I find it convenient that the t/hole operation s~..a.ll be carried out. • • •
One half' million exchane;ed into Portugese pieces, the only
money current in America, will be promptly sent there, for
there is an imm.odiate necessity for the Americans to have a
little gold at once to give life to their paper money, which
without means of making it circulate already has become useless and 8tar~ant in their hcmds. It is the little leaven
tha.t 1s necessary to put into the paste to raise it and make

it ferment usefully.
Upon that half million no benefit can be obtained except
the return of it in Virginian tobacco, which Congress must

furnish to the house of Hortales, \-mo will have made a sale
in advJ:1I1ce to the Farmers-General of Fr~mce, by which they
will take the tobacco from them at a good price; but that
is of no ~eat consequence •
.Roderir;ue Hortales counts on employing the second half
million in the purchaso of cannon and powder, which he \.'111
forward at once to the Americans. 9
Here follows an exposition ot the proceedings, with an
explanation of how, supposing the king permits him to buy powder
at the actual cost price from the magazines. instead of buying it

in the market of France, Holland, or elsewhere. the money invested
by the kinF~ will increase not in double pror,ression,

1, 2, 4,

e.

etc., but in triple progression 1, 3, 9, 27. etc.
Your Majesty will not be frii~htened at the complicated
air that this operation assum<.~s under my pen, when you remember that no commercial speculation is carried on or suc-

ceeds by any more simple or natural means than this.

I have treated this ariair in so tar, Sire, in the
spirit of a. great trader. who wishes to make a successful
speculation and I have developed to you the unique secret
by Which commerce in bulk augments the prosperity of all
states that ha'Ve the good sense to protect it. • • •
It the return in tobacco and the sale of the product
take place a.s I ha"'le pointed out, Your Majesty, soon will
.find yourself in a position to send buck by the hands ot
Hortales et Cie, the three million provided for troe the
price and profits ~£ these returns, to recommence operations
on a larger scale.

-

9 Elizabeth s. Kite, ,eiUfll3rchai§ .i!!S the
Boston. 1918, I, 7-79.
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.2l Ameri-

Then follow considerations upon the auvisability of ertlplaying Dutch or Fl·ench vessels for the transport of the munitione

to Cape Francais. chosen by Hartales at Cie, as the first depot
of commerce.
Holding to the choice ot Irench vessel charged to the
account ot Roderigue Hortales et Cie, Congress, or rather
l'lr. Adams, Secretary of Congress, will be alone forewarned
by the agent in England that a. vessel is carrying to him at
Cape Francais both goods and munitions, which are to be returned in Virginian tobacco, so that he may send to the Cape
upon a vessel landed with tobacco an agent who will bear his
power to receive both and to send back by the captain of
Hortales et C1e •• the entire return in tobacco or at all
events a recognition that he owes Uortales at Cie. the
ba.lance of the a,q1ount tor which he may not have been able to
furnish return.J.J.

So tar, in Beaumurchais's mind, the mercantile undertaking

'WaS

to be tor the king, only cloaked by the appearance of a.

Imercantile house.

It seems, however, that the French government,

anxious to evade all

possibl(~

risk and wishing to deny all conni-

vance in the transactions J decided to rernain entirely foreien to
Ithe

operation.
The government said:
lie will give you secretly a million. i'1e will try to obtain the same amount from the court of Spain • • • with
these ttlO million and the co-operation of private individualSj
whom you will associate in your enterprise, you will found
your house and at your own risk and perils you \dll

11 Ibid., II, gO.

provision the Americans with ar~~ and munitions, and objects
of equipment and whatever is necessary to support the war.
Our arsenals will deliver to you these things, but you will
replace them or pay tor them. You shall not demand money
or the Americans because they have none, but you shall ask
returns in commodities of their soil, the sale or which we
will facilitate in our country. • •• In a word, the operation secretly sanctioned by us at the outset must erow and
develop through its own support. But on the other hand, we
reserve the right of favoring or opposing it according to
political contingencies. You will rendel' us an account or
your profits and losses, while we will decide whether we
should grant you new SUb!~dies or discharge you or all obligations previously made.
In this transaction, the responsibility of the agent to
~he

United States had no consideration.

~ment

The advances of the gov-

were siP.lply a guarantee to Beaumarchais against loss.
The difficulties and dangers of this undertaking, ac-

~ording

to I;!. de Lomenie, were of a nature to cause any man other

han Beaurnarchais to hesitate.
his with all his usual coura~e.

He, however, threw himself into
On the tenth of June, 1776, a

onth before the United States had published their Declaration ot
ndependence, he signed the tamoua receipt which occasioned a suit
astin~

fifty years.

The receipt read thus:

I have received of IiI. Duvergier, conformably to the
orders ot 1/;. de Vergennes, on the date of the 5th of this
month the sum of one million, for which I shall render count

12

Ibid., II, 81.
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to my said Sieur Comte de Vergennes.
Caron de Beaumarchais.
Good for a million of livres tournois.
At Paris, this 10th of June, 1776.J.J
Two months In tel", Spain advanced a like sum.
~ion

to this Beaumarchais associated himself' with numerous private

~ndiv1duals
~he

In addi-

in France and elsewhere, so that his first sendine to

runericans surpassed three millions.
Early in June the vast roorcantile house of H.oderigue

~ortales et
~d

Cie was established at Paris, while agents, clerks,

employees of' every sort were installed at the center of opera-

~ions,

as well as at the various sources of supplies and in the

~eaports.
~very

Beaumnrchais remained the head and center of action in

place.
It so happened, that a complete change was

n the equipment

beinl~

r:1ade

ot the French army, so that the arsenals and

~orts were charged with munitions of war, which the governr:1ent was

~illing to dispose of at a nominal price. l4

Before the arrival of Beaumarchais on the scene ot ac~ion

the Comte de Vergennes had countenanced and furthered the

~perations

be£l,'Un by Franklin before he lett London.

Among the

gents employed by the latter were the Brothers Mantaudoin of

13 Ibtd.t II, $1-82.
11..

Ib:i,d., II, 82.
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Ne.utes. \-/ho had undertaken the transportati on of munitions of war

to the Americans.
Another abent and intimate friend of Franklin was a
certain Doctor Dubourg, a man mor e or 1e as widely known as a
scientist, but possessinG as well, a decided ta.ste for mercantile
operations.

He had entered heartily into the cause of the k.reri-

cans, and was very zealous in forwarding munitions of war to the
insurgents.

He seems at the beginninG to have possessed to a

considerable degree the confidence of the French minister. who
deigned to correspond with hun in person, and to consult him on
several occasions.

As it bect::L.'!le necessary "to act on a grander

scale t the interverltion of the friend of Franklin was no longer
sufficient."
a§fl;e~'oDI

The "faithful and discreet agent" spoken of in the

had long been fixed in the mind of the Hinister of War.

The good doctor, who knew nothing ot the relationship between the
faraGus author of the BarRiel" 5l! §evhJrl, and the French government
or of his interest and services in the cause of American Independence J all along had been secretly aspiring to a complete control

of the transactions.

\'nult succeeded in convincing him that he was

destined tor the place was that early in June, 1776, Silas Deane,
the 2l{;ent of the Secret Committee ot Congress, arrived in Paris
charged with a letter .from Franklin to his ttdear

f~ood

friend,

Barbeu Dubourg, tf with express instructions to regard this latter

S8
as "the best ,~:lde to seek after and to to 1 low • ,,15
Elated at this mark of esteem shown hinl by the colonies ~
Dubourg undertook to fulfill then to the letter the instructions

of Congress and to prevent Silas Deane tram coming in contact
with anyone, but himself.

Deane soon realized that though "in-

spired with the best intentions in the world, ft the doctor would
be Us hindrance rather than the essential personage pointed out
by

Franklin.,,16

He, therefore, insisted so strongly upon meeting

the French minister tha.t Dubaurg was forced to yield.

The meetin

took place the 17th day at July, 1776.
Silas Deane at this important meeting fulfilled the in.
tention of his mandate with intelligence, and with a reasoning,
which could only come from a vir;ilant patriotism.
sian, which he could desire to produce and which

All the impresW;lS

hoped from

his miSSion, flowed from his replies. l ?
The

Count de Vergennes appeared to refuse to give the

aid asked. but he led Silas Deane to understand that a confidential agent 'Would take the matter in charge.
agent was no other than Beaumarchais.

15

~••

II, 82-83.

16

~.f

II, 83.

17

~.,

II, 84.

This confidential

Four days before this interview, Doctor Dubourg had
learned to his ,great disappointment where the confidence of the
minister had been placed.

Knowing nothing of the real situation,

he thought to disuade Deane from his choice by attacking the

private character of the man who had usurped his place.

The

effect of his letter upon the Coote de Vergennes can be judged
from the fact thnt the latter immediately communicated it to

Beaumarcha1s himself, who was charged with the reply. 18
On the 11th of July, Silas Deane and Beaumarchais met

for the first time.

Both men recoenized at once in the other, thE

mlln for whom each was looking.

selfish natures.

Both had warm, generous, and un-

Both had their minds fixed upon ane object

alone, the procuring and sending; of aid as quickly as possible to
In excusinr.; himself to Congress tor dis-

the insurged colonies.

carding the services of the ffdear, good friend" of Franklin,
l,ir. Deane wrote:

"I have been forced to discourage my .friend on

seaing where tho confidence ot M. de Vergennes was placed."

At

the same t1rne he does al!l.ple justice to the kindness and interest

manifested by Dubourg.

19

Beaumarchais, finding Silas Deane empowered by Con["):,,ess
to act directly, ceased to communicate with Arthur Lee.

16

~.

19 ,b!d., II, 81.
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Already a change had come in their relationship.

\lhen

be returned to France he found the government bent upon another
form of offering aid to the Americans.
break his connections with Lee.

It became necessary to

Unable to explain the true

na.ture of the enterprise, because he was bound to absolute secre-

cy, Beaumarchais wrote on the 12th of June, 1776:

ttThe difficul-

ties, which I ha:.r6 found in my negotiations with the ministers,

have forced me to form a cO!:lpany, which will cause aid to reach
your friends immediately by the way of Cap Francois. 20
Naturally enough, this meager infol"'mation was very un-

satisfactory to Lee.

More than this, he himself had hoped to

play a principal role in the enterprise.

From Beaumarchais he learned that Silas Deane had arrived from the colonies

~1powered

to treat _ith the rndnisters,

who had refused steadily to permit his own appearance at Versailles.

He learned that Beaumarchais had entered at once into

negotiations with the aGent of Congress and that he, Arthur Lee,

was

bein~

consulted by no one.

Lee, enraged and disapointed

hurried to Paris, where he tried to brine about a quarrel between
Deane and Beaumarchais.

FailinG in this, he returned to London,
anGered in his disappointment and furious s.r;ninst Deane. 2l To

20 lb1Q., II, 87-88.
21

~.,

II, 8a.
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a.venge himself he wrote to the Congress, that the 'two men were
aereed to deceive both the French Government and the Americans
by changing what the former meant to be a gratuitous offerinr.

into a commercial speculation.
These letters arriving in Philadelphia before any repor1
from Deane, predisposed Congress--(two of whose members were
brothers of Arthur Lee )--against t.he measures Deane was t.akine

wi'th Beaumarchals.

For the moment, however, no one interfered

wi th their operations and both men were too intent. upon the all-

important matter in hand to speculate upon the possible results
of 'the irritation of Doctor Dubourg, or the anger and jealousy
22
of Arthur Lee.

By the beginning of ltiarch, ten vessels of Roderigue
Hortales at Cie. were floating towards

AmEn~ica.

that month he announced that fact to VerGennes:

The seventh of
"Never," he

wrote, "has the commercial aftair been pushed with so much vieor ,
in spite ot obstacles ot every nature, which ha.ve been encounter-

ed.

~my God ~ive it good success. n23

Beawnarchais, naturally, expected to receive very soon
many expressions of gratitude trom Congress, as well as much
•

22

~.

23

~.,

II. 124.
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f;1!lryland and Vir[',inia tobacco. He did not even rece! va a reply
to his letters. 24 Nevertheless. he continued to send out ships
laden with supplies, all through the spring and summer, receiving
trom his agents alone intormation of their safe arrival.
The failure of Congress to ratify the conditions oftered by its commissioner would have brought to ruin the Commercial house of

Roderi~e

Hortales et Cie, 1n spite of the subsidy

of two millions with which it had been founded, bad not the Gov-

ernment again come to its assistance.

'rhough the ministers in

general, and Vergennes in particular, never entirely deserted
Beaumarchais, other and wholly different measures for aidinr: the
Americans were now seriously occupying their attention.

The

colonies, in declaring themselves free from British rule, had
forced upon France the necessity of coming to
decision.

This she was slotl in doing.

some

definite

It was inevitable that

she should take an active part in the strugeles.

'the measures

necessary for the arming and equipping of her torces were already
being discussed in her councils, while the nation, eone mad with
enthusiasm, was urging her forward in the pathway, which could

lead to nothinG but open wnr. 25

24

25
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To be of service in eiving France a chance to hurt her
rival in secret \'lithout beine forced to pay the penalty of making
a wru." she could ill afford, was the aim whi ch prompted Beaumarchais in aiding the American colonies financially in the

l~evolu-

tion.
Underneath was the desire for notoriety and applause.
The first concrete aim was
never fulfilled in America.

accompli~led

in 1776.

The second was

Here he was never generally known

even in name and never applauded, althourp he was sufficiently
well known by the leaders of the Continental and later Coneresses
to be thorou[';hly suspected as a self-seeking trickster. 26
This was, in part, due to the prejudiced statements of
Arthur Lee.- who made Beaumarchais' s acquaintance in London in

1775, and to those of Dr. Dubourg of Paris.

Both of these men wera

rivals of Beaumarchais, the former for fame or popularity, the
Intter for the commercial enterprise, which fell into his opponent f IS hands.

Lee in his chagrin at not being able to claim that

he had won the support of France, and his more or less sincere
bewilderment over the secret dealinss ot the French

~overllment

wi th Beaumarchais and the colonies, influenced the Continental

Coneress directly.

Dr. Dubourg influenced Benjamin Franklin,

94
whom he had met sometime before in England, and' welcomed to

paris in 1776.
To put it briefly, Beaumarchais in

1775 used to ques-

ion Arthur Lee adroitly about American conditions and, in the
a1"ly days, when he was forming his vague schemes for commercial
salines, he discussed them with Lee.

Since Lee got the 1mpres-

ion then that the business firm was a mere envelope for the aid
o be eiven to America by the French govel"nment, he always
tfirmed thereafter that the colonies were not indebted to the
irm ot Roderigue Hortales and Company.

He could not influence

ilas Deane, however, so he complained ot him to the Continental
ongres8 with enoue;h force and grounds for that a~ent to be 1"eaIled from Paris.

l.leanwhile, Dr. Dubourg on finding that Beau-

archais in some mysterious way was being made an unofficial tool

t the French government in helping the colonies, sent a letter
f remonstrance to Vergennes on the plea of Beaumarchais's lack

r bUSiness capacity or experience and r~s alleged Urunorality.

He

ould not deter Vergennes from his plan nor force him to acknowlee that it existed. but although V.-sennes and Beaumarchnis had
y a

laugh at Dr. Dubourg's jealous int~~tIons. they could not

event his influenCing Franklin, and through hIm, as America's
iss, practical man, ft influenCing all the proceedines of the

95
60ntinental

Con~esa

in regard to theil"

dealinf~s

with RoderiL'1.1e

.
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Hort·al es and Company.

ot the three American commissioners with who!.'!

Beau.llar-

chais had to deal, he made a favorable impression upon only one,
Silas Deane.

He hud shown himself thr0Ur";hout all his life very

shrewd and successful in reading the minds, understanding the
temper, ood influencing the ,judgments of his fellow Frenchmen.

He

did not seem to understand the American colonists, especially the
Yankees.

He did not even suspect the role he

gain their confidence.

ou~ht

to assume to

He could not realize that to these non-

theatre-goal's, a playwright· must be in close touch with the devil
~imself •

He could not have suspected that his facetious and un-

~usinesslike

~iographer,

letters condemned him again and ac;t.dn..... Lomenie, his
understood the character of the colonists better.

Only imagine serious Yankees, who had nearly all been
traders before becoming soldiers, receiving masses of cargoes, which were frequently embarked by stealth durinG the
night, and the invoices of which consequently presented some
irregularities, and all this without any other letters of
advice than the rather lantastic missives sigled with the
romantic nEUlle ot Roderigue Hortales and Company in which
Benumarchais mixed up protestations ot enthusiasm, offers of
unlimited service and political advice, with applications for
tobacco, indigo, or salt fish, and ended with such tirades as
this one, whi ch we may take as typical:
Gentlemen, consider my house as the head of all operations useful to your cause in Europe, and myself ~8 the most
zealous partisan of your nation, the soul of your successes,

~;

I

"

I'

96
and a man profoundly filled with the respectful esteem with
which I fu~ve the honor to be,
Roderigue Hortalez and Company28
Hazard has quoted this vivid and sympathetic explanation from Lomenie for it seems to be the key to much of the mis-

understanding of Beaumal'cha,is's troubles with the Continental
Congress.

This fantastic, popular hero in business, though not a

real merchant, was no fool.

By

l7n, he had corne to the point ot

understanding that the colonies would not pay their debt to him
unless he appealed to something more than their honor.

I

He sent

De Francy to obtain justice from Congress far the past, and prevent his future cargoes from being gratuitously delivered.

The

new contract made with the United States in 177$ sounds thoroughly businesslike but frdoes not calm the troubled watera..

Shipments

continued under its provisions but payment for them is not made
Congress."

b~

Beaumarchais'a efforts remained unappreciated and his

financial outlays were not reL~bursed.29

On February 6, 1778, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane,
and Arthur Lee.. as commissionE?rs of the Thirteen Colonies, con-

cluded a treay of alliance with the French government.

The

tr~ee

articles, which are most important to this study, are Articles
VI. VII and XI.

28

Jb~d.,

29-30.

29

~.t

30.

,
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Article VI states:
The lOst Christian KinG renounces forever the possession ot the Islands of' Bermudas as well as any part ot the
continent of North America, which before the treaty of Paris
in 176), or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to
belong to the Crown ot Great Britain, or to the United Stateq
heretofore, called British Colonies or which are at this
time or ha~. lately beeUOunder the Power of the King and
Crown of Great Britain.)
Article VII states:
If his Most Christian Majesty shall think proper to attack any of the island situated in the Gulph at 14ex1co, or
near that Gulph, \.qfl!ch are at present under the Power ot
Great Britain, all the said Islestlin case of success, shall
appertain to the Crown of France.~
Article

n guarantees the possession at the French \'Jest

~ndles to France "rorever trom the present time and against all
~ther

powers."

The article states:

The two Parties guarantee mutually from the present time
and forever, against all other powers, to wit, the United
States to his most Christian Majesty the present possessions
ot the Crown of France in America as well as those which it
may a.cquire by the f'utux'e Treaty of Peace: and his most
Christian Majesty guarantees on his part to the United
States, their liberty, Sovereignlty, and Independence absolute, and unlimited, a.s well in l·{atters of Government as
commerce and also their Possessions, and the additions or
conquests that their Confederation may obtain during the war,
from any of the Dominions now or heretofore possessed by
Great Britain in North America, conformable to the fifth and

)0 Miller, Treatiel at:lSl qther Interogt 1.Rnal ~
United §tijte§ at. M\eri\ca. ;Qpsumeats l::l&Q.: lZZ6-;l;8l,8, 38.

31 1la.!!., 38.

s:. Y!!.

sixth articles above written, the ,"vhole as their Possessions
shall be .fixed and assured to the Said States at th~ moment
ot the cassD.tion ot their present v/ar with Enr;land.)2
At the same time another agreement known as the Treaty

pf Amity

and Commerce was signed by the representatives of the

itwo nations.
The clauses of this proposed agreement contained ideas
~ar in advance
~ith

~e

ot the exclusive system of commercial legislntion,

which every country was fettered in the eighteenth century.
most important ~re the first two clauses.

~hese

~uties

The first of

provided that the subjects of France were to pay no other
in American ports than Americans paid, and wero to enjoy

all the rights and privileges in navigation and commerce between
the two countries, which the Americans themselves enjoyed.

'fhe

second clause secured these sarae rights to the citizens of the
United States in the ports of France and any ''fest India Islands,
which might be secured by France as a result of the war. 3)
The proposed plan was adopted by the two nations in the
!treaty of February 6, 1778.

The treaty when si51ed, however,

fContained two clauses, which, had they remained, would have been

32

33

~bid ••

39-40.

George F. ZOOK, uProposals for a New Commercial
Treaty Between France and the United States, 1776.1793," t:l0ut11
Atlantic (~ty:terlx, 1909, VIII, 268.
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of great importance to cO.nmercial interests.

The first of these

provided that no duty should ever be laid upon the exportation
of molasses from the French
~n

\~est

Indies to the United States.

return for this favor, which would have been so important to

ithe

Northern States, it was ai"reed that no duties should be im-

posed upon any kind of merch..!indise exported from the United
~tates

to the vJest Indies.

Since the policy of taxing exports

Irrom the States was not contemplated, it seems as if the eonees~ion

made by the Feench was a valuable eift.

It was not so ro-

r;arded by Arthur Lee, one of the Ameri can commissioners, and
~a1ph

Izard, both prominent men trom the South, who were disposed

1\10

think the bargain favored Northern interests at the expense

pi

all others.

The opposition of these men was so bitter that it

decided to sacrifice both exemptions, and the treaty as
~inally ratified did not contain these two clauses. 34
~as

FRENCH NAVAL ACTION IN
THE \iiEST INDIES

When the French government, at last, resolved to take
an active part in the war, a fleet under Charles Henry Count
d'Estaing, was sent out

b~om

Toulon on the 13th of April, 1778,

with orders to attack any fleet bound to or from Amerioa.

At

the s arne time they prepared to send out another fleet from Brest,
under Count d'Orvilliers.

The first hostility took place off

the coasts of Brittany, the A,tethW:;l, of Keppel's neet, having
on the 17th of June begun the war by attacking the

Bel~e

Poule,

n French vessel of equal force, commanded by the brave La Clocheterie, who distinguished himself in the first, to die fighting
most gallantly in the last battle of the war.

This led to a

fiercely contested, but indeoisive action off Ushant, on the
21st of July 1778, between the English fleet under Keppel, and
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the French fleet under the Count dfOrvilliers. l
Meanwhile the Count dfEstaing ran across the Atlantic
and began hostilities on the 30th of June, by capturing an Englisl
vessel off Bermuda.

On the 5th of the next month, the frigate

Engg,&eMte of his fleet took the English .frigate !lose, the first
real capture in the war.

An unfortunate delay prevented his

blockading Howe in the Delaware and he appeared off Sandy Hool
July 11, to be abandoned by pilots, and outgeneraled by Howe, who

prevented d'Estaing, misled too by Tory pilots, trom entering
when he might in fnct have sailed up to the city and closed the
war.

D'Estaing then devised a plan with Lafayette and Sullivan

to take Rhode Island.

He ran into Newport and compelled the

English to destroy their vessels there.

Just as operations were

about to begin Howe appeared, DtEstaing went out to meet him.
Howe avoided an action, a storm came on, d'Estaiugts fleet suffered, and abandoning the seige of Newport to the grea.t dissatisfaction of Sulliv(ID, he sailed to Boston to repair.
Leaving Boston he allowed Hotham' s squadron from New
York to go, almost before his eyes, to Barbadoes.

Proceeding to

Guadaloupe, in December he engaged Barrington, but failed to
capture his small squadron, and saw his arms repulsed with loss
in his attack on St. Lucia, December 18.

\

I
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The next year, having been reinforced by tour vessels
under de Grasse, he reduced the islands of Saint Martin, St.
Bartholomew, and St. Vincent.

On the last day of June, he sailed

from Fort Royal with twenty-five vessels of the line, and two
frigates, and early in July, after a sharp action, reduced Granada.

On the sixth, a very sharp engagement took place between

d'Estaing and Byron, in which the latter suffered severely.
The next operation or Count d'Estaing was another
on an English post in the United States.

attac~

Savannah was assailed

on the 9th of October, by American and French troops, the former
under Lincoln, the latter led by d'Estaing in person.

In spite

of the valor of the allies, they were repulsed with heavy loss.
Thus ended the naval and military campaign of d 'Estalng, from
which the Americans had expected much and obtained nothing. 2
The campaign carried on in the West Indies had no
special effect on the progress of the war.

D'Estaing was a man

of much bravery and of some energy, but he could not handle ships
with the skill of ane whose life had been spent on the sea.
Little was accomplished for some months.

D'Estaing certainly

did not overestimnte his successes, and he was never afraid to
tell the truth about himself.

He wrote home in January, 1779,

that he had gone from one misfortune to another, and the ling's

2 Ibid., 15-17.
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squadron had not even been able to retake Saint Lucia.

"If I do

not entirely succumb under the weight of misfortune, which has
characterized the events of this ruinous cmnpaign, I am none the
less filled with extreme regret not to have been more useful in
the service of the King.")

~I "

In the summer of 1779 he was somewhat more fortunate.

i.~ I

,.

The French captured Granada and Saint Vincent, and d'istaing
defeated the English under Lord Byron, who was by no means as
great an admiral as his nephew was a poet.

Even then d'Estaing

was criticized, and perhaps justly, because he did not utilize
his victory to the utmost; apparently, if he had possessed greater
talent as a sailor, he might have destroyed the English fleet.

"If he had possessed as much sea-craft as bravery," wrote an
officer, "we would not have allowed four disabled vessels to make
their escape."1t
The Count de Guichen, who succeeded to the command of
the French fleet in the l¥est Indies, broug,ht Rodney to action,
April 17, 1780, but the battle produced no result, and a

sirnilarl~

indecisive action took place 14ay 19.
) James Breck Perkins, France !.n the American RevolutiQD. Boston, 1911, 271-272.
It

Ibid •• 273.
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In l7g1, the Chevalier Destouches sent a part of his

from Boston to the Chesapeake, under

r....

de Tilly, who

captured the RomulU§, and several transports, but most of the
enenyts vessels ran up to Portsmouth.

Destouches himself then

sailed to the Chesapeake, and had a spirited action with Graves,
in which he put three of the English vessels hoI'S de combat.
De Ternay. who brought another French squadron across the Atlan-

tie, allowed an English squadron to escape from him, and died ot
mortifica.tion soon after his arrival.;
Such had been the main operations of the French navy
American waters up to the time of the campaign of the Count de
That such fleets were sent by both governments to opel'

m the

dangerous waters- of the West Indian Archipelago, and waste

their strength on the reduction of petty islands, when a continent was at stake, is not easily explained.

The time was spent

in taking and retaking small and unimportant isles, the posses-

sion of which was of not strategic importance.
the

In the war on

Continent, the operations at Newport and Savannah, both
failures, and the operations of' Destouchas in the Chesaalone show the intervention of our transatlantic allies,

5 Shea, The Operation gf.
~:;.o;;, de grAIl., 17-1iJ.

~
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and it is clear that the assistance rendered by the French navy

was of little moment, except in the fact that it gave occupation
to all England's neets. 6
Francois Joseph Paul de Grasse-liouville, Count de Grasse, Marquis de Tilly, Lieutenant-General des Armeas Navales was
born in 1723; but of his earlier career, even the bi ography published by his son gives us no particulars.
of the war with
~

~~gland

brought on by the American Revolution, he

was captain of the Robaste, and had been in active service, apparently in her, since 1775.

"
~.(

~

At the commencement

~ith

that vessel he took an active

part in the naval enga,gament f01.41ht off Quessant in July t 1778.
In the following year, still in the same vessel, he sailed as

...............

"chet-d'escadre", or commodore, from Brest with four ships of the
line, and anchored 1n the road of Fort Royal, February 20, 1779.

He shared in the triumphs and reverses of d'Estaing's campaign,
ftl

in the reduction of Granada, in the seige of Savannah, after

1;,

\fhich he sailed to the\iest Indies with a portion of the fleet.

i:ta

Here he distinguished

him~elf

in 1780, under de Guichen, in his

engagements with Rodney, rescuing the
superior English :force.

§Rhmo and Artesi;en from

a

Declining the corrunand of the squadron on

the ground of health, he returned to France, where he wa.s raised
by

the king to the rank of lieutenant-general or admiral, and

6 Ibid., 18.
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invested with the command of the neet in the \/est Ind! es, which
d'Estaing and de Guichen had hitherto directed with
though not with brilliant success.

jud~ent,

The elevation of de Grasse

gave offense to many officers in the navy, and involved him in
difficulties which ultimately dimmed by a fateful reverse, the
!laurels won in the earlier part of his naval campaign. 7
The West Indies were the chief object of de Grasse's
~rui8e,

and any expedition to the United States was regarded as

pi secondary interest.
~d

As a matter of fact, the fleet accomplish-

little during its first stay among the islands, and oet with s

~erious

disaster the following year, while the expedition to the

phesapeake ended a long and momentous contest. 8
The King's neet, comma.nded by Lieutenant-General Count
~e

Grasse-Tilly, set sa.il on Thursday,

M<~ch

22, 1781, with a

ponvoy of two hundred and fifty ships valued at thirty million

~ivres.9
The following accoWlt of the action of the French fleet
~n

the West Indies is based on "A Journal of the Cruise of the

7

Ibid., 20-21.

g Perkins, France in the Amer!cga gevo*ution, 357.

-9 Shea, Operations
~ Gra§§e, 30.
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Fleet of His Nost Christian Majesty, under the command of the
Count de Grasse-Tilly, in 1781 and 1782, by the Chevalier de
Goussencourt. ft edited by J. D. G. Shea in the book, Ihe

2! the French Fleet Unde£ th! C2Hnt

~ Qra§s~

O~rat1ons

!n 1181-1Z82.

On Sunday, April 29, 1781, a French fleet of twenty
ships of the line sighted an English fleet of eighteen ships
of the line and five frigates off the shores of Martinique.
The French vessel, the LinSHeQgc, fired on the enemy, but
missed. Havine seen the strength of the French. and losing
hope of capturing any vessels, the English came on a tack
similar to the French. 'fhe French eave chase, but were
becalmed. Four English vessels ran afoul of each other and
became separated from the fleet. Some of the French commanders thought they should be captured but 1-1. de Grasse
paid no attention to it. No other officer would take the
responsibility. The French then anchored at Fort Royal,
~Iartinique.
All efforts to eneHge Admiral Hood failed •. The
action lnsted five and a half hours. The French lost one
officer killed, one dangerously wounded, and one hundred and
fifty men killed or wounded. Hood tried in vain to enter St.
LUCia, but was prevented from doine so by the French. Rodney was then engaged in pillaging St. Eustatius. The French
pursued the En~lish ineffectually for three days. The tact
that M. de Grasse let four vessels escape which might have
been capture led to a dispute at St. Pierre between several
French naval officers. This was the origin of an ill feeling
that afterwards prevailed in the fleet.
The chase of the English having taken them quite some
distance to the leeward, it took the French until May 6 to
regain the island of' Martinique. They set sail on the eighth
for the channel of St. Lucia. On May 15, they anchored in
the roadstead of St. LUCia, in Gras Islet Bay, where the
battery kept up an ineffectual fire.
On the morning of the 16th, the lone boats and barges
went ashore to bring otf the troops there and the prisoners
they had taken amounting to one hundred and fifty men and two
officers. M. de Bouille saw that the siege of Morne Fortune
would require an army of twenty thousand men. The English
made no greater opposition to their reembarkation than they
had to the landing of the French troops.

.11

!I

Ii
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At'daybreak on the 29th, having discovered Tobago on
one side, and seven English vessels and five frigates on
the other, the French g'we chase but to no purpose. In the
evening the Atgrettl asked leave to give chase, and took a
brig of ten guns.

On the 31st, being near Tobago, the French sighted
several ships. They hoisted the English flag and the ships
threw themselves into their hands. A slaver, with two hundred and fifty negroes on board, and several smaller vessels
were captured in the same way.
Late in the afternoon of June 2, the fleet anchored off
Tobago. This island had surrendered the previous evening to
1>1. De Bouilla, who had landed with eight hundred men three
days before. The capture of Tobago cost the French only
three men. They took ten officers and three hundred and
sixty men, and left a garrison of eighteen hundred men, arms
and money.
The next afternoon they set sail again, the G.orie~
and the St, E§iirtt haVing discovered the enemy r!eet.t
was Rodney com ng to the relief of Tobago, but learning that
it was taken, he would not haza:cd an action that could result only in mutual slaughter, because the fleets were of
equal force. M. de Grasse. on the contrary, SOUtt>.t to engage the English; but being to leeward, he could not overtak
them.
The chase of the English having made them fall consider
ably to leeward, on the morning of June e, the }!'rench admits.
asked for the bearings of several vessels because little at-

tention had been paid to the route they had taken. At noon
they discovered that they were near Granada, where they
anchored on the tenth of June.

On June 13, the fleet again set sail and lay to before

St. Vincent, where they waited for the general of the troops,
had gone there the day before.

who

On July 5, the fleet and its convoy of over two hundred
vessels set sail tor Granadina in search of the Hect Q and a
convoy of fifteen sa11. After making the junction. t ey
steered for Cape Francois, while the Enr~ish, coming from
Barbadoes. steered for Jamaica, from which Uodney sailed
with his treasure to En~land.

t
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On the 14th, Commander de Glandevese was detached with
four ves~e+s to cruise around-St. Domingo and the small
isles adJacent to the leeward, and to relieve the Astionre which was blackaded by two English ships of the line
an two frigates. l

naa

The following account of the preparations for the Yorktown affair is written in diary form and is based on tlA Journal
of the Cruise of the Fleet of His Most Christian Majesty, Under
the Command of the Count de Grasse-Tilly, in 1781 and 1782 by
the Chevalier de Goussencourt J rt edited by J. D. G. Shea in the
book,
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July 30th, ordeC to hold ourselves in readiness to sail
and to sh ip cannons J mortars, and all necessary to make a
r(~gular siege.
The same day we took on board our vessel the
regiments of Gatinon, now Royal Auvergne, Agenois, Touraine,
and a detachment of ~uzunts legion.
August 5th, all being ready, the signal was given to
unmoor. and on the 6th at 4 A.M., to loose sail. Our fleet
numb~..red twenty-four vessels, and the wonder is trat· everybody, the Enelish included, knew where we were going, while
we had not even conjecture as to the opera.tion that our
admiral was about to take.

On the 7th the commander, de Glandevese, who had
sailed around t~e island to leeward, joined us with the
Bl;f~oiRe and the Hect~r.
The Ast!onnair~, which had come
W1t tle commander's ive vessels. anchored on the 8th at
the cape.
10

~.J

42-55.
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On the 10th, the light squadron gave chuse to the Engli
frigate which had chased the l!.!. and forced her to put in at
the Hole St" Nicolas, after sh-shad fought three times; first
with a frigate, which she sunk; next with a fifty gun vessel, which she cut up considerably by a maneuvre which excited the admiration of the enemy.

On the 11th, we entered the old channel and took in a

Spanish coast pilot comine from Baracao L a town lying on the
northern coast of the island of Cuba. The
passage of this
channel is justly considered a very dangerous spot. We were
so happy as to spend t~xee days in the narrowest part of the
pass, wInch is surrounded by reefs on every Side, experiencing an unsupportable contrariety of winds.

.~)

l.~
'i

!
I
}
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At this period we flattered ourselves that we should behold the superb city of Havanna, the capital of the island of
Cuba, and the richest and strongest place in America; the
Spaniards having added considerably to its fortifications
since the last war. The A~s:@tte alone went there, and
brought ofr tour millions, which served as an excuse for the
seventeen men of war there! not to accompany us on the expedition \'{c had on hand.
s it not a shwne for these vessels
to be rotting two years in port? It is only a nation as
cowardly as the Spaniard that can wallow so in inaction,
leaving its allies to bear the brunt of the war •
On the Hith we lay to off M~\tanzas, three leagues trom
that town, and stout thirty from Havanna. \ve sent our pilots
ashore. and entered the Bahama channel, into which the currents carried us. At this point, being in order J we learned
that the projected expedition was to the Chesapeake. Here
the charming maritime ill-temper displayed itself in all its
beauty, for they closed the council-chamber door on the
gentlemen ot the Royal Auvergne, commanded by rei. de TourVille
who could not help taking up the silly remarks they passed
on the Count d'Estaing.

On the 24th, we took three English vessels; one of
which, commanded by a lieutenant in the navy, carried sixteen
six-pounders and eight eighteen-pound howitzers. • • • TIle
smaller ot the other two was carrying to England a general
officer who had commanded· at Savannah and Charleston, which
he had left a week before J and who enjoyed the highest reputation. All these vessels, and those subsequently taken off
this coast were loaded with merchandise for Europe.

i'l
1,1

,1.1

1'1

'i
1.,1"

111
On the 28th, the fleet anchored three leaeues from the
roadstead of the Chesapeake, according to the advice of
the coast pilots whom we had on board. We had not yet seen
any land, which here lies very low.

,

,

"

r,,'

On the 29th. we anchored in three columns. in the
entrance of the roadstead, after chHsinr:; a number of vessels
that we could not make out. You will not perhaps be astonished to learn in what security the English live. Having
anchored and displayed our flag, '\tIe were approached by a
boat in which was one of the principal citizens of Virginia,
who asked where Lord Hodney was. The sailors on deck hailed
and one of them who spoke English well, told them to come on
board, ~lich they did at once. But what was their surprise
to see only infantry in white uniforms. They were taken
to the main cabin where we WHre at dinner, and where the
captain informed them that they were prisoners, ordering
them to be well treated. The boat was taken, and found to
contain excellent melons and many other rifreshments,
whi ch were eaten in honor of Lord Rodney_
The greatest French contribution to the success of the
American Revolution was the naval support which the French fleet,
under the Count De Grasse gave to the land forces, under \jashington and Rochambeau in the Battle of Yorktown.
be discussed later in Ylis study.

This action will

CHAPTER VI

TIm i{OLE OF TIm FRENCH

~lEST

INDIAN

FLEET IN TIll; SUlL-tENDER AT

YORKTOWN

Before the campaign at Yorktown the French vlest Indian;
fleet accomplished very little in a military way.

It served

merely to keep the British fleet occupied and away £rom colonial
shores.
A large share of the credit for the capture of Yorktown
be~ongs

to the Count de Grasse who performed his part with great

exactitude.

He prevented the

Enl~ish

from relieving Cornwallis,

and brought an important reenforcement to the land forces.

If

his fleet had not arrived promptly and remained until the work
was done the capture of Yorktown would have been impossible.
Uochambeau wrote in the spring and early summer telling
of the needs of the Ameri can army and asked for pronpt cooperation
against the common foe.

De Grasse proceeded to take energetic

steps to answer these calls for help.
worked out for him.

There

W::1.S

no definite plan

He acted upon his own responsibility in
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transporting a body of soldiers to Vire1nia to the West Indies.
He had to negotiate with the Spaniards who had not interest in

the American allies of France.

He even had to risk the disappro".

at of his awn government.
When he arrived at Cape Haytien on July 16 he found the
letters ot Rochambeau and the French minister stating the importance of prompt aid to the American cause.

At once he tried to

meet these requests to the best ot rds ability.

A large force

of French troops was stationed at Saint Domingue. but the French
government had agreed that they should be at the disposition of
Spain and were to be used tor an expedition to Florida.

The

Spanish admiral was not ready for the Florida campaign and wanted
to postpone it until winter.

De Grasse took advantage of this

and asked the French governor to lend him these troops in the
meantime.

This was a bold step.

If the troops he borrowed were

not returned to Saint Domingue in time to embark for Florida when
the Spanish asked tor them, de Grasse had to incur the risk of
severe censure by his own government.

He was able to persuade

the governor that these troops could be spared for two Dr three
months.

!

I
I
~
:,

,I

It was decided that thirty-four hundred men could be
spared from Saint Domingue until November, although this was not
the five thousand suggested by Rochambeau.

They were borrowed

from the governor with the express promise that they should be

,il

returned by that time.
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Since Spanish ships were to keep guard

of the island, the Spanish indirectly were rendering assistance
to the colonists whose allies they had refused to become.

1

De Grasse found it hard to obtain any money, and the

amount Rochambeau asked for was utterly impossible to raise.
tried, unsuccessfully, to borrow from some of the

mercl~ts

He
at

Santo Domingo, even though he offered to pledge his own estate
as security for repayment.

He then went to Havana to see if he

would be more successful there.

He found seventeen Spanish men-

of-war lying peaceably at that port, with the customary inact! vity of Spanish warfare.

Perkins quotes an earlier historian, in

this way:

I
I

I

I
r
I

i

Is it not a shame tor these vessels to lie rotting two years
in port? It i8 only a nation as cowardly as the Spanish
that can wallow so in inaction, leaving its allies to bear
all the brunt of the war.~

If the fleet remained inactive, the Spanish furnished
de Grasse tour million livres in cash, which was more useful than
the cooperation of their ships.

It furnished the needs of his

fleet and left a large surplus which he gave IUS associates in

1
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America.

Having obtained the necessary money and having the

fleet off Havana. their destination was publicly announced.
After a voyar,e of twenty-three days, de Grasse's fleet
anchored off the roadstead of Chesapeake Bay on August 28.

The

The troops were landed at Jamestown Island on September 4 and 5.
Cornwallis made no attempt to prevent the landing.

An

enterpris-

ing general might have attacked the French in the confusion of
disembarking, but the British left them undisturbed.

They joined

the forces under. Lafayette, who now had an army of seven thousand
men. 3
In the meantime, Clinton was puzzled as to how to meet
Washington's

tl~eat

against New York.

In a letter \iritten to
I

Germain in London, Clinton remarked that, since Admiral Graves
the fleet away from New York, he would write to Admiral
had taken
,
Rodney, the British commander in the West Indies. to watch de
Grasse.

He feared that the French fleet would slip away from

the West Indies and come north to cooperate with Washington in
an attack on New York.

Clinton adds this prophetic remark:

"For I must beg leave to repeat to your Lordship that it the

I

L

I

I
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Enemy remain only a few weeks superior at aea, our insular and
detached situation will become very critical."4 One must understand "insular" in its older meaning of "isolated."

He complains

to Germa.in that he has not heard from London for tour months.

No

wonder he felt "insular."
In the early summer of 1781 the royal navy had many
notable admirals, but none was available at New Yark.

Hyde,

Parker, Kempenfelt, Darby, and Shaldhamwere kept busy defending
the homeland because ot threats upon the coast of England by
France and Holland.
Indies.

The next most important work was in the west

Admirals Uodney and Hood were responsible for defending

the Sugar Islands, where so many English families had heavy investments.

Besides, they had to watch de Grasse, New York was

relatively unimportant.
Admiral Rodney at the West India station, as was explained earlier, had been busy for some time with the combined
pleasure and duty ot looting the Dutch island of St. Eustatlus.
The consequences of this act proved very annoying because Rodney's
ruthlessness made no distinction between British and enemy goods.
vllien he finally sent thirty shiploads of plunder to England, the

French naval commander, La ),!otte-Picquet, dashed out from Brest
••

4 Randolph G. Adams, "A View of Cornwallis' Surrender
at Yorktown," 'manica D Historical ReView, New York, 1931 XXXVII,
29.
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and captured twenty-six of the convoy.

Therefore, Rodney had

other things on his mind besides watching de Grasse.
Rodney learned, on July 7, that de Grasse, who was
supposed to be at Martinique, had left there with thirty-six warships.

His informant did not know where they were going.

Adams

gives this account of' Rodney's attempt to justify his actions:
In order to clear himself afterwards, Rodney said that
upon receipt of' this intelligence he had specifically
warned the admiral at New York that de Grasse had sailed
for Cape Francois (to pick up more troops and supplies),
and was thence bound for the Chesapeake; therefore let
the adrniral at New York beware. If any such dispatch had
actually been sent, and had actually been received at New
York, both Graves and Clinton might have been forewarned.
But they were not-for two reasons. First t Uodney never
sent such a message. ~;ihat he really wrote on July 7 was
that de Grasse had left )furtlnique, that Rodney did not
know whether he had Wone to Cape Francois, but that he was
destined to sail to America," without speCifying the
Chesapeake. This made a great deal of difference, because
Clinton and Graves expected de Grasse to come north. but the
word nAmerica," instead of "Chesapeake" would simply confirm
Clinton and Graves in their opinion that de Grasse was coming to cooperate with \vashington in the attack on New York.
The second reason that Clinton had not been forewarned was
this: the dispatch, even in its vastly different form, was
entrusted to Captain Wells of the sloop SJa~9U. Wells
reached New York safely, but as the dispatch was addressed
to the Admiral, and Graves was absent cruising off Boston,
Wells started to folloH him, when, off the coast of Long
Island; an American privateer moved into sight. Wells
could not resist the temptation to punish the impudent Yankee
skipper. The result was preCisely opposite of what Wells
intended, because tl~ee more uapudent Yankees sailed up, and
\'Iel18, carrying important dispatches, which he had no rl.ght
to jeopardize, was compelled to destory them and beach the
SW§btgw on Long Island. Graves did not receive Rodney's news
unti six weeks after it was sent.'

5 Ibi,q. J 33-34.
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It has been obsorved that Rodney received 1nf' ormation

to the effect that de Grasse was bound for Santo Domingo.

Two

days later Hood was ordered by Rodney to take eight ships to
Antiqua to refit and to sail with them to reenforce Graves at
New York, because de Grasse was probably on the way to join
Barras at Newport.

Soon after this Rodney became very ill, and

he ordered Admiral Drake to take command in the Leeward Islands
while he returned to England for his health,
New York.

Hood was sent to

vihen Rodney learned that a convoy of merchant vessels

bound for Jamaica was nearby, he ordered Hood to take twenty-four

ships, instead of eight, and conduct the convoy safely to Jamaica
before going north to join Graves,

A week later. Rodney, deceived

by some discontented British subjects, sent Admiral Drake on a
wild goose chase to Saint Lucia with six ships to attack a French
~orce
~is

Rodney had only himself to blame if

that did not exist.

conduct at St. Eustatius turned those who might otherwise have

~een

loyal against him.
6
~ngland on August 1,

He was forced by illness to return to

It is probably fair to say that the British had no real
~dea

of the Franco-American plans~

~mericans

They were as puzzled as the

in regard to de Grasse t s purpose.

They thought that the

tFrench admiral might come north. but they had no idea when or with

6 Ibig., 34-35.
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",ha.t numbers.

Unfortunately for them, they assU!.'led that de Grasse

~as

bringing only a few vessels.

~ng

this out.

~aying t~~the

~ight
~as

Clinton should have been think-

On July 2$ he sent a routine dispatch to Germain

understood that de Grasse had left Martinique and

be expected off New York at any time, but, since Hodney

following him, there was nothing to worry about.
Admiral Hood, off Antigua, received some real news on

~ugust

r.he

3.

Just before he sailed for England, Rodney had received

information that thirty American pilots for the Delaware and

lliesapeake had arrived at Cape Francois, the French sector or
anto Domingo.

It was there that de Grnsse was going.

nformed Hood without comment.

I

as, sent the sloop, Astiv"

Rodney

Hood, seeing how important this

to warn Graves at New York.

Luck

'as with the Americans, for the Astive was captured and taken into
hiladelphia.
ost. 7

The significance of pilots for the Chesapeake was

In mid-August Clinton, somewhat
u~~ested

~ecovered

in spirits,

to Graves that, since de Grasse could not possibly ar-

ive for another week or ten days, they might try again to attack
ewport.

Upon receivine this suggestion Graves decided that two

hips needed repairs.

He believed that the story of de Grasse's

7 Ibiq., 35-37.

!.
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coming was merely the product of a "heated imagination."

Even if

de Grasse did come, it would be only with a few vessels to replaCE
those which Barras was sending back to France to refit.

Clinton

might get something done at last when Graves's ships were repaired.

On August 18. he had three thousand men ready to embark,

and could go to llewport on twenty-four hours notice.

However, it

I

took two days more to repair the ships.
Clinton had an attack of blindness. 8

Then, on August 20,

On August 19, Adjutant General Delancy received three
dispatches from the British scout Marquard.

In the first, writ-

ten in the morning, he announced that he had positive infornmtion
from one of his woman agents that the French had struck camp and
were marching for North Castle and that Washington was preparing
to cross the Hudson at Dobbs Ferry.

The second dispatch, written

in the afternoon, confirmed the first but could not euess which
way the Franco-American forces were going.

The third dispatch,

written when the rank'lle informant reached r,1arquard's headquarters
in the evening, was equally confusing as to why and where Washington was going.

On AUEust lS, Lieutenant-Colonel Wurmb of the

Jagers had positive information that "an American womant who was
the mistress of a French officer of distinction, had been instructed to go to Trenton."9
~bid.,

37-38.
9 Ibid., 39.
g

Thus, although he had been warned
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from two directions, one of which was rather close to the French
high command, Clinton took no action.
received three more notes.

On the twentieth, Delancey

Wurmb reported that the Americans
According to Marquard, rebel

had certainly crossed the Hudson.

baggage and heavy artillery were going across.

Captain Beckwith

could not be certain what the Americans were planning, but he was
sure that their whole plan had suddenly undergone a drastic
change.

From this it seems that the British intelligence was

working, but not very well.

I

I!

!s

\
"j

!
j

f
,I
I

The information made very little
impression at headquarters. 10
Graves went on repairing his ships.

On August 21, he

reported to Clinton that he had just heard that Barras was preparing to leave Rhode Island.

Clinton reported that he had re-

liable information that de Grasse
north.

w~s

bringing only a tew ships

Neither Graves nor Clinton had any idea of Barras's des-

tination.

It seems odd that they could not have realized that

Barras was

goin~

to join de Grasse.

By August 22, Cornwallis,

having reached Yorktown, was so busy digging in that he informed
Clinton that he could spare no troops tor another six weeks.
Lord Cornwallis was alarmed because or three factors.

First,

Wayne and Lafayette had in some way been reenforced.

Second,

a mob of Loyalist refugees. who hud been following him trom

10 Ibid., 39-40.
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portsmouth, were consuming his supplies more rapidly than he
iked.

ne

Third, although Clinton had sent three thousand entrench-

tools south, Cornwallis's engineer's records showed only nine

nmdred and ninety-two while less than four hundred could actually
~e located by the storekeeper. ll
Admiral Hood arrived with his ships of the British
lest India squadron on August 24.

He had seen nothing of de

Prasse and did not know where he was.

themselves that Hood arrived at New York before

~ongratulating

~e

Grasse.

~rench

The British probably were

Marquard, the scout, sent word to Delancey that the

had now crossed the Hudson, that for three successive

they had moved their camp, and that Washington was carry...
~ng flatboats, for what purpose, the scout did not guess. l2
~ights

Graves decided that, with the addition of Hood's fleet,
)
"

On August 31 J he put out

J.

is force was superior to the French.

t!

0

~

ight have been joined by a few vessels from de Grasse's West

f

~dia squa.d.1"on.

sea to seek and punish Barras's lit tle fleet, even though it

Cornwallis, that same day t learned that between

~i

f'

hirty and forty ships had come inside the capes of the Chesa-

t

eake, but he did not say what they were.

11

12!!!.; 40.

12

Ib~d ••

40-41.
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Clinton was certain that Cornwallis need not fear the
French fleet because Hood and Graves would talte care of it.
These two brilliant admirals, however, tailed and failed badly.
Believing de Grasse had only a few ships, they found him to have
a fleet that outnumbered the combined fleets of Graves and Hood.
A naval battle was fought off the capes ot Virginia on September 5.

Some authorities have called this battle "indecisive."

However J Adams believes that few na.val actions in history have
decided more.

Graves, hruldling his fleet badly, got only a part

of his force into the action and was severely damaged by de Grasse.

Both fleets maneuvered for position after the fight and it

seems that Graves was actually nearer to Yorktown than de Grasse
at one time.

Graves put out to sea instead of taking advantaee

of his position to rush in and rescue Cornwallis.
contact

HoOd lost

de Grasse and, on September 10, wrote to Graves
asking him if be knew where the French fleet might be. l '; Graves
~th

didn't know either.

It wa.s three days before he replied that the

French fleet was at anchor in"the Chesapeake and asked Hood's
opinion as to what to do with the fleet.
futile:

Hood's reply was equalll

"Sir Samuel would be very glad to send an opinion, but

he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentable state

13

~.,

42.
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we have brought ourselves. n14

It was decided at a council of

war, held at sea, that, because of the damaged state of the
fleet, the coming equinoxial storms, and the impossibility of
helping Cornwallis, the British £leet should return to New York
to refit.

Because Barras had gone into the Chesapeake with the

Newport squadron and de Grasse was stronger than ever, it was
impossible to help Cornwallis now.

Now Graves understood why

Barras had left Rhode Island.
While Clinton waited, it took Graves two weeks to
reach New York after the action orf the Chesapeake.

In the mean-

time, Commodore Affleck represented the navy at a council of war
called by Clinton on September 17.

The somewhat hysterical na-

ture of this conference may be detected by reading between the
lines of the minutes.

Affleck wanted to take five thousand men

and convoy them in a single ship of the line to Yorktown.

How

he proposed to get this last hope through the entire French fleet
does not appear.

General Leslie, frantic at the delay, wanted

something, anything, done at once.

General Robertson, objecting

[to haste, sugGested that they wait not only tor Graves, but for
~he

added naval forces being sent from England under Admiral

~igby.

The traitor Arnold was called in to another war council

w-hich was called the next day.

It was agreed that they should

wait for Graves, Hood, and Digby, since Cornwallis had eight

14

~.f
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thousand men with provisions for ten thousand to the end of
October.

On the fifteenth, Graves reported that his damaged

fleet Was on its way back to Sandy Hook.

He added sadly that

the French controlled the Chesapeake, and that nothing could be
gotten into Cornwallis except at nig)lt.

His fleet was huddled

together for fear that the French cruisers might cut out the
straggling vessels. 15
Graves finally arrived back in New York with hLs badly
damaged fleet on September 19.

It certainly was in no condition

to set sail immediately convoying troops to Cornwallis and to
attempt to break through the entire French fleet in the process.
Because it took ten days to determine what repairs were needed,
it was not until the twenty-third that ten ships were sent to the
yards and work begun.

That same day another council of war for

the general officers was called by Clinton.

They

rencl~d

the

rather obvious conclusion that the only thing that could save
Cornwallis was a direct move by the army and navy.

This

necessitated the calling of another council at which the flag as
well as the general officers were to be present.

They met the

next day and decided to put the troops on the "Kingts ShiPS."
that is, the royal navy not the transports, and send word to Corn
wallis that they would start south by October 5.

15

I21£!., 43-44.
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Admiral Dibgy arrived that same day at Sandy Hook with
a small naval reenforcement which included Prince \li'illiam Henry,
destined to become King William IV of England.

Almost a week

after he returned to New York, Graves discovered that there was
no lumber with which to repair his ships.

Clinton had to send

over the wood which was to be used for barracks at st. Lucia.
Then Graves found that he did not have the combustibles to prepare fire ships, so Clinton had to open up the army ordnance
stores.

On the wenty-sixth, Prince valliam landed and the next

two days were wasted in parties, parades, receptions, and
speeches.
A

letter from Cornwallis stating that if he were not

speedily relieved, Clinton might expect to hear "the worst,ff
reached New York on the twenty-third.

Clinton interpreted this

to mean that Cornwallis would be forced to retreat out of harm's
way.

Three days later it occurred to him that the "worst" might

have another meaning, and he called a council of his general
officers.

They expressed the opinion that the "worst" rooant that

Cornwallis could not retreat, but would be forced to surrender.
Clinton sugeested a raid into New Jersey toward Philadelphia in
his anxiety to do something.
the
be

groun~6that

This plan was wisely rejected on

the army should not be away when the ships should

ready.

16 Ib14., 45.
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Di'by and Hood did not want the army and navy putting
out to sea without some idea of what they were to do when they
re:l;ched Virginia.

Therefore, they sought out Clinton and began

asking questions.

Digby wanted to know if the navy were merely

to take the army within striking distance of Cornwallis and then
retire to a safe distance.

Clinton rejected any such notion,

for how was he to feed that army without the fleet?

Diiby asked

again, how was the fleet to get out if by some miracle they
could get through de Grasse's augmented fleet?

They also doubted

if Graves would be able to sail on October 5 as he had promised.
Clinton called another council to discuss these points.

They

agreed on only one thing, that, since Graves vlou1d not be ready
by October 5, Cornwallis should be notified to that effect.
Graves, confirming their fefU"s, said that he would not be ready
before October 8.
Adams gives this picture of the discord at British
headquarters at New York:
Captain \Jilliam Cornwallis of H. M. seventy-four gun ship
was storming around because Graves's delays were
rmperillng his brother, Lord Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown.
Major Darner, Germain's friend,'was one of the officers who
had been embarked, disembarked. B.nd reembarked until he was
decidedly acid in his comments 011 Clinton's incapacity and
his failure to anticipate Washington's plans. \'Jll1iam Smith
wrote that Clinton was a domineering trifler surrounded by
a staft of third-rate sycophants. Arnold was disgruntled on
many counts--the more so when he saw his advice being ignored by the British uS much as it ever had been by the
Americans. Old General Robertson relieved the tension by
~

12$
being "abandoned to Frivolity--he has Parties of Girls in
the Fort Garden in the midst of his own Fears, and the
anxieties of this Hour." V.
Clinton called another council of the flag and general
officers on September 30, when he learned that Graves could not
sail betore October 8.

It was agreed that. even though the

whole French fleet were between them and Cornwallis, they must
sail.

The question was when.

It became apparent that they would

again be delayed until October 12.

l'il11en

the navy men withdrew,

the army men held a separate council a,t which it was decided to
inform Cornwallis of the ne\1 delays without telling the navy that
they had done so.
While the Americans tightened their lines about Yorktown, the work on the ships at New York went on.

On October 3.

t'/ashington was within eleven hundred yards of Cornwallis's works.
vilien Graves discovered that there wa.s no powder £1 t for use on
board his own flagship, the London, Clinton again patiently
opened up the army stores.
The next day, Clinton and Graves got into an unfortunate argument.

Graves began it by reopening an old question of

whether the Sixty-ninth regiment belonged to the army or the navy

17 lh!a., 45-46.
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GrtlVes declared that 1 t was needed

tar

r:kvine duty Otl Hood' a

squadron. while Clinton lnsisted it was his.

Then Graves aaked

what was to be done with the troops embarked on the war vessela
if it wel"a 1r!lpossible to relievo Corn\iallis and Hood should have

to roturn to his Hest India. station.

Was Hood supposed to take

with him the troops carried on his vcssela?

tallving the West

Indies unguarded meant cr1t:toi&"':1 in P ",liament iro.-n the British

investing Clt18Se.h

This seemed to bo ther Graves more than Hood,

but then Hood. in Adam' 8 opinion, was probC'lbly an abler rm:ln than
his super1or. 18
On Octobel" 7. Clinton. writing to Graves, suggested

that it Hood had to return to the l1est Indies in a hurry, empty
transports should tallow the fleet at sea.

It they were unable

to relieve Cornwallis. then Hood was to transfer the troops to

t.lle transport at Gaa..

a meeting ot

f'lllJ~

Graves said he wOL,ld present the mattel'" to

officers the next day.

cided that a meeting of' flag and
to iron out this difticulty.

(~neral

Digby wld Clinton de-

officers

WMS

lleCeasar'1

Digby was to sec Graves and

asl~

him

to cc)me to anny hendc.,us'rters the ne..'Ct day tor such a !!1eeting.
Graves, apparently angered at whnt he thOU£"Jlt was Clint.on· s
attez'Jpt to order hitt around. h:1.d called a meetinr; of his awn flag
,

I

P 1

,

,

F d
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officers for that day.

On the morning of the meeting, he sent a

very stiff letter, written in the third person, in whioh he said
to Clinton, "Don't wait the meeting for me, as I shall not be
there. ftl9
At this meeting, even Hood was convinced by Graves's
behavior that he was going to make trouble and create difficulties for the army.

Hood solved the problem of the troops on

board his ships by saying that the relief of Cornwallis was of
primary importance, and that the West Indies would have to take
care of themselves.

In reporting to a friend, Hood wrote this

to a friend:
I own to you I think very meanly of· our present commanding

officer (Graves). I know he is a "cunning" man, he may be
a good theoretical man, but he is certainly a bad practical
one, and most clearly proved himself on the fifth of last
month to be unequal to the conducting ot a great squadron. 20
Clinton did not answer Graves's letter until the next

day, when he answered with tact and civility that the apparent
offense was a misconception.
Another council of generals was called to take up the
questi on of what to do with an army and a fleet which the French
would not per'mit to reach Yorktown.

It was decided that they

would land either at Newport News or on I\iJondayt S Paint. on the

19

~.,

20

~Qid.

47.
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north shore ot the York river.

An examination of t'he map wot."ld

show that it was impossible to land at either place.

During the

meeting, a shift in the wind made it impossible to sail, even if
Graves had been ready.
The Americans were within six hundred yards of Cornwallis's works on October 11.
dred yards on the twelfth.

They cut that down to three hun-

Heavy artillery was subjecting

Yorktown to a furious bombardment.

Clinton wasted the fourteenth

in writing Cornwallis of his plans for landing the troops.

He

assured Germain that the army of relief had already embarked.
On October 15, the fleet was still windbound at New York.

That

sarne day Cornwallis wrote sadly that it was too late, if Clinton
came now he would risk losing his army too.

Another council of

war was held on the sixteenth at which the generals saw the
futility of their landing plans.

However, they were determined

to see the matter through and land on the even more inaccessible
Itappahannock.

Cornwallis wrote to '\;lashington the next day pro-

posing a capitulation.
It was not until October 1$

tt~t

the army and navy,

Clinton and Graves, and the all important wind, decided to play
together.

The army for the relief of Yorktown proceeded only as

far as Sandy Hook when the tide turned against it.
did not get to sea until the nineteenth.

The armament

Clinton wrote to

Germain. from Graves t s flagship, that he would be in time to save

ljZ
Cornwallis.

However, in a private letter, he wrote in a way to

show that he knew that he was embarked on a hopeless expedition.
Even if they defeated de Grasse, whose fleet still outnumbered
the British, they would still have to deal with the combined
forces of Washington and Rochambeau.

Clinton bitterly blamed

Germain for failing to send men and supplies and for misleading
him into believing that Hodney would take care of de Grasse.
Clinton and Graves reached the Chesapeake on October 24
only to find that Cornwallis had surrendered his army five days
earlier. 21
The French viewpoint of this ca. .npaign is described in
diary form in l:b.!

Ra

Q£as,.

in

OJ?erat~onl

SlL t,he Frgncb

F.e~t

UndE!f the Cg:y,nt

&78.-.182, edited by J. D. G. Shea:

September 1st, our triops got in boats and were landed
without the slightest molestation from the forces composing
the army of Lord Cornwallis, although he had a ship-of-theline. three frigates, and several small vessels. The
EnglIsh general mi~lt have prevented us from doing anything,
and even repulsed us, had he not despised our small army_
At our first encampment it would have been annihilated i f
attacked. Three days after, it formed a junction with the
army of M. de la Fayette, eighteen hundred strong, but Who,
at the same time, received a reenforcement of eighteen hundred more Americans t aaking in all seventy-six hundred.
The English numbered eleven thousand men. When told that
the French had landed. their general merely remarked that

,

1
•

"

I

"

i
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he had been long expecting them, and was glad that they
had come. For all that, he soon had reason to repent it. 22
The 2nd, the Aigrette arrived from the head of the bay
with several prizes made by our different vessels, among
others by the
whleh gave chase to the p~r~, of
fifty guns but co
not get at her on account 0 t
shoals, and which was burnt during the siege of Yorktown.

cu,Rraff'

The 3rd, four of our vessels were detached, and
stationed at the mouths of the rivers, by which we took a
considerable number of merchantmen. \tie were in the greatest
impatience in the consequence of the non-arrival of the
CswcordE?, a frigate of 1-1. de Barras' squadron, which was to
announce to us the moaant of the junction. In fact, we did
not know what to make of the delay j and some of the navy
officers, jealous of his merit, accused him of being a bad .
citizen, and of being unwilling to serve under M. de Grass.,
because he had, he said, his option to remain at Boston or
to join him. Already they wished to make him responsible
tor the blunders the admiral was to commit. In these circumstances M. de Barras will be seen giving a rare exwnple
ot patriotism, which is unfortunately known only by name in
France. We were in the ~~eatest uncertainity as to what
was to happen, when our two frigates on guard outside
signalled sails in sight. These soon proved to be Enelish,
to the number of twenty-one men-of-war, two of them threedeckers, and five frigates. As a combat was deemed certain,
orders were given to hoist 8al1. 23

At halt-past eleven, orders were given to slip our

cables, and leave the bouy; at noon, to clear decks, and to
form in order at speed. This, for a wonder, was pretty well
executed, for every vessel had a hundred men in the boats,
which had, as I have said, been landinr; our troops. The
fleet formed in very bad order; for, to tell the truth,
there'were only tour vessels in line, the ~, the ~
ggrt, the Matae1lla1§, and the Diagem!_ ~tGecbx
an the ~ came next, half a teague to the ee
the
first, ~ rest of the fleet a league ~. to the lee

or

;:

22 Shea L Editor, The 0fir!t1516S .2l. thg French f~eet::
nder ~he Count .9.! !:£§,@e
ill I'ml-_~L.
.
23

~b,g.,

67-68.
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of the latter, the V;~lle ~ Par!! in the centre; the English
were in the best possible order, b~wsprit to stern, bearing
down on us, and conaequently to our windward. Admiral Graves
commanded, having under h1m Rear-Admirals Hood and Drake;
they made an immense number of signals to each other betore
engaging us. The Fdlglish vessel, the T!£r1'Qhl. which was
pumpin{~ tour pumps not feeling in a condition to take part
in the action, kept to the windward ot the enemy's line,
athwart Drake, who sienalled her to take her poSition, which
she lost sOlllet1rilG in doing; but the rear-admiral soon persuaded her to take her place by sending her three cannon
balls. Then it was that they tacked to the larboard as we
did, and hoisted a great white flag astern; but they soon
struck it and hoisted their own, It was then tive minutes
atter three, and the head ot our l1ne was within rUle shot;
and, in tact 1 entirely separate from the rest ot the fleet;
a di8agreeab~e position. Then they poured their first
broadside into the ifttleChy t killing the captain. That vessel soon bore away as we! as the ~t on \~hich they kept
up a brisk fire. +hen 1·1. de Grasse--sIT'9lulled to the vessels J
at the head of the line, to bear away two points. which was
impracticable:l as they were righ tint~ wi thin gun-shot distance wld WOUld have got a very severe handing, had they
presented the stern. The four ships in the van found themselves, consequently, cut otf' trom the rest of the fleet, and
constantly engaged with seven or eiGht vessels at close
quarters; and the Qii4eme was constantly near Admiral Drake,
who sat fire to her at every shot. the wadding en taring her
side. This vesaal was constantly engaged with two and some..,.
times three vessels. The Enelish wOdld not cut off our van,
which they might perhaps have taken, and which they wOli.ld, at
all events, have rendered past repair. They cm~ented themselves simply with euttine up that part of our fleet which
kept up a distant fie;ht J the sailors of the
S!. PariA
having been the last to take part in the act on. M. de Bougainville commanded our van; but he was too tar to leeward
and 1n no condition to relieve the DIAdems, Which could
scarcely hold out, and was on the point ot boarding the
~iQqlll!h commanded by the rear-admiral, who avoided her.
'
en he turned all his fire on the ~*b.e, which he riddled,
60 that the English had to sink her t le next day. ¥ii th all
this, this vessel was utterly unable to keep up the fight,
having only four thirty-six pounders and nine eighteens fit
for use, and having all on board killed, \rounded, or burnt.
At this juncture M. de Chabert, comroandine the ~ §lJ:rit,
which had, tor a long time, been enGaGed with tne-En? 186
admiral, and who was himself wounded, seeine the imminent

1,11e
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danger of the D~A4tm! hoisted sail and was soon in her wake
then he opened a terrible fire that the gentlemen ot Albion
could not stand,and had to haul their wind. The contest
was kept to the centre for half an hour longer. For our
part we were so tired, that though within Mrshot, the vans
no longer fired. At six. the battle closed .....
In this affair we lost .four hundred men and twelve
officers; the English came otf with the loss of seven hundred men. and many persons of distinction. We had to go to
the assistance of the lllid~m2 immediately after the battle,
as she had lost one hundre and twenty men and had no saila
or rigging! bavint~ received one hundred and twenty-five ball.
in her hul, and twelve under the water line. We ahould
have had to abandon her t had the sea run high, and do \tlith
as the English did with the Ierr~l!. It is well to note
that there were only tV'i8nty-two
aneh vessels in this engagement, all badly manned. The enemy had twenty...one in
line, one of fifty guns and some frigate.

The English committed a great fault in this action. As
soon as we lett the roads of the Chesapeake, they should
have entered and anchored. They were before the wind, and
by hu,~ng Cape Charles they might eas11y have moored with
a spring in the cable, before we ''Iere formed in line and
ready to attack them; this would lea.ve us no alt.ernat1ve,
but to grapple them. Otherwise our army would have run the
risk of being deprived of everythinet perhaps have been
captured even; our vessels stationed at the York, Baltimore, and James rivers woiid have been taken, as well as all
the boats ot the fleet. Hood was in favor ot running 1n
here as we shall see him do at St. Christopher's, but
Admiral Graves durst not. Another blunder that our enemies
made was their neglecting to cut oft our tour vessels at the
bead t which they might perhaps have taken, or at least cut
otf l"'rom the rest of the fleet. 2,
There 18 no reproach to be made to M. de Grasse in this
affair. except hi8 not making in time the signals to take
position in order ot battle, and the blunder ot not

24
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postinp; himself at the entrance of the bay and refusing to
fight. He· committed II grosser blunder of this kind afterwards; for, on this occasion, he might allege the tact that
he was waiting for Cornmodore de Barras, and that he exposed
him prodigously if he did not fight and force the enemy to
open the entrance to the anchoraee of the Chesapeake.
On the 6th, we did not lose sight of the English, and
the wind haVing varied slightly, by maneuvering a great deal
and the English little, we gained the weather-gage.

The 7th we still kept them in sight. On this day they
sank the tetr1bbe. In the evening we lost sight of them,
the sea beg1nning to run high and the wind increasing,our
admiral made us steer for the Chesapeake. We did not, however, make Cape Henry till the eleventh; and at the same
time we saw two English frigates, the Iri; and &1C bmAA d eac
of forty guns chased by the glrrteJl' as ahe came up wl th
the former an~ engaged her at p ato shot distance; but she
had to haul off, she got so hardly used. Seeing that they
held out so, several of our good sailors got at their heels;
the rest of the fleet joined, and we poured in over two
hundred balls before they struck. We made the Count de
Barras, who had been at anchor in the roads for two days,
start out two vessels of his diVision. as he could not make
out which nation we belonged to. He had witnessed the
affair of the fifth, but being unable to distinguish the
French fleet, he had anchored in the roads, where we found
him. lie dropped our anchors at six or seven in the evening,
well sut13fied with our prizes, and especially to get our
boats again, which joined us this day, bringing back our
best man.
The 15th there came on board our fleet 1,1. de Gustine, a
colonel of the regiment of Saintonge, commanding the van of
General Wnshingtonts army, composed of a thousand French
grenadiers J and as many American volunt eers. He proceeded
to join ~1. De la Fayettet and announced the speedy arrival
of the combined armies or France and America, with all
necessaries of war, and provisions; for our troops suffered
for want of the latter.

On the 18th, the vessels bearing our soldiers arrived
by the Baltimore river, and the greater part of the army,
coasting along, and brineing from Philadelphia all that was
needed, and even more; for plenty always reigned in the

l
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camps, although this country had been completely devastated
The American general came on board the
V;lle de Paris, where he had a long conference with M. de
Grasse, and the other two naval commanders. On his departure he was saluted with thirteen guns. He joined his army,
twenty thousand strong, including Rochambeau's and Lafayette's armies. I think that when Lord Cornwallis was
told of J.Ir. Washington's arrival, he did not say, "so much
the be~5er,n and must have laughed on the wrong side of his
mouth.
by the Enr).ish.

The combined army having invested the English, they
retired to Yorktown, posting a large detachment at Gloucester, a town on the other side of the river, and immediately
opposite York. The enemy had already put these two places
in a respectnble state of defence, and four redoubts protected the approaches. They thought· proper however to
evacuate'the smaller two, which were, too, farther off. On
the 2Oth t l.tord Oornwallis wished to cross the river" but was
prevented by the fire of our frigates and other smaLl craft,
chiefly· prizes taken on that coast. As the wind became ver'1
violent, ~{. de Grasse ran his fleet into the
and anchored on a line, with springs on the cable. We al made our
repairs then more at ease and got water more conveniently.
It is worth remarking that we got it only by diggin four
or five feet in the sand. This country is so well wooded
that I saw on board the D+i1eme a piece of timber costing
twenty-eight trancs, measur
thirty feet long.and twenty
inches square. You may judge from this that we all made
our repairs easily and without sparing.

bar

ng

On the 30th, M.. de Grasse disembarked six hundred
marines from the vessels to reenforce M. de Choiey's corps.
They repulsed the enemy. and compelled them to retire to
Gloucester. The conmanders had established such'good communication that we heard from the c~~p every day, and were
even near enough to 8ee what was going on; for we witnessed
the spectacle of the conflagration of an English fifty-gun
ship, set on fire by the French battery.
On the 19th of October, M. de Barras was sent to the
camp in the admiral's place t and took part in the capi t ulation of the positions of Yorktown and Gloucester, and of

,
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Lord Cornwallis's army, composed of eleven thousand men, an

army which had cOM.lni tted atrocities. 2 7

The surrender at Yorktown cannot be traced to any sing14

cause.

Adams states it in this way:

No one who has surveyed these sources can fail to be impressed with the fact that the surrender at Yorktown, like
most historic events, can not be traced to any single cause.
It was the result of interacting causes. Germa.in's wrongheaded favoritism and his failure to support his principal
commander; Cornwallis's mistaken belie! that a British
victory was an American defeat; Clinton's failure to divine
the plans of Washington in time; the condition of Graves's
fleet after the battle with de Grasse off the capes of the
Chesapeake; Rodney's illness; Clinton's blindnessl Graves's
incompetence; Hood's failure to keep track of de Grasse-all these explain something. Nothing, however l can detract
from the extraordinary patience and strategy or George Washington, who after watching ill luck for five years, at the
last managed a campaign in which every essential e~eroent
functioned on time and in time. This story might w~ll be
entitled, 'When Britain failed to muddle through. f28

town," 49.
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CHAPTER VII
THE TREATY

Ol-~

PAH.IS I 17 S)

By the terms ot the Trea.ty of Paris, 1763 t which ended

the War ot the American l:tevolutlon, the islands ot the West Indies were returned to their former owners.

The one exoeption to

this was the tiny island ot Tobago wh1ch was oeded by the British
to France.

This seems to be very little compensation for the aid

sent through them to the Americ,an; ,rebel ••
The secret

or

lutiOll was coopel'".tion.
can cooperation.

Ameri (".an suecess 1n the War

or

the Itevo-

J.1ore specifically J it was Franco-Ameri-

flo perr!k-ment success waa posa! ble t no permanent

success was achieved, until practical coordination of effort was
brought about between the allied enem!e. ot Great BritaIn. l
fhe treaties 8Ianed in 178) affected prImarily four

natloruu

Spain, France. England, and tha United States.
,

.l:lli.

From

II

1 Elizabeth 3 •.Kite. "The Significance or the Treaty. It
kll1ix,g( PUi, or 1783. Washington, D. C., 19.35.25.
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the first, Spain had lacked the necessary faith, disinterestedness, and consequently the Vision, to enter wholeheartedly into
the Alliance.

At the peace, signed by her and France with Eng-

land, she was forced to forego the chief object that had brought
her to tardy entrance into the war.
the reconquest of Gibraltar. 2

That cherished object was

To compensate her for this loss

Spain was allowed to retain Minorca and have all Florida, east
and west, and Gr(~at Britain would keep Gibraltar. 3
Before the Dutch could arrive at any agreement with the
British, the other parties had long since arranged tinal terms.
In vain, the Dutch, with only perfunctory support from the French
were clamoring tor the restitution ot aln captured colonies, tor
outright recognition ot the prinCiples of the Armed Neutrality by
Great Britain, and for damages for captures during the war in violation of them.

The British, on their part, firmly demanded

either Trincomalee, on the island of Ceylon, or Negapatan, on
the southeast coast ot India opposite; the right to navigate
freely among the Dutch possessions ot the East Indies; and the

.2

~.,

32.

3 Bemes, The n'P4gffi9CY

&( the Amer,Can ~2!9lut1on,

...
humiliating salute of the British nag on the high leas by all
the Dutch vessels, as before the war.

Finally, Vergennes noti-

fied the Dutch plenipotentiaries that he could wait no longer
for the relief from the financial expenditures that would come
to France with a final peace, that Franee and her allies would

sign the definitive treaties

on

September 3rd.

The llutcb were

farced to capitulate. 4
Looking at the final texts of the French and Span1ah
treaties, we do not find that Great Britain, once accepting the
inevitable loss ot the American colonies, tared

80

badly.

She

was required to cede the relatively unimportant island of Tobago
to France, but she received back all the other conquered poa-

sessionsl

Granada and the Grenadines, Dominica, St. Chl"iatopher,

NeVis, Montserrat.

She yielded to France the slave-trading

preserve of the Senegal River, but retained one on the Gambia.

She relinquished St. Pierre and Miquelon to provide France with
tishing bases in the Gult of St. Lawrence, but clouded the c.s-

sion with declarations making it difficult to fit them tor naval
bases.

She continued French tishing rights on stipulated cout.

of Rewtoundland, but1n doing this she was recognizing. in new
~ater8.

no mare than 'ranee already has possessed in others before

l
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the war.

In India the articles of peace were astonishingly

favorable to Great Britain.
before 1778.

France gained no more than she had

In fact, the British were able to conclude peace on

the principle that they first proposed, the independence of
America and the Treaty of Paris ot 176) as a fundamental basis,
with a rew exchanges, and minor cessions in North America and
the eastern Mediterranean.

To Spain, Great Britain gave up l:linor-

ca and the two Floridas, and agreed that the British wood-cutting
settlements on the "Spanish Continent" should be restricted to
a certain portion or the Honduran coast, between the Belize and
Hondo rivers, and this without derogation to Spanish sovereignity
there; but George III retained Gibraltar and with it control of
the entrance to the P-lediterranean so valuable in those future
wars when that sea was to be of vast importance to the preservation of the British Empire.;
The crowning result of the Treaty was England's unconditional acknowledgment of American independence.

Because of

conquests in the northWest under George Rogers Clark, the United
States secured much additional territory, and though it took
another short conflict. that ot 1812. to shake loose Englandts

5 llaJ1., 2;).

'1
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hold on those remote torts and to bring her to respect neutral
shipping, yet for more than a century mutual goodfellowship has
existed between England and the United States. 6
As for France, restored self-respect, readmittance to
her place of leadership in the councils of Europe, increased
prosperity at home through a widened sphere of activity and more
liberal trade regulations, compensated her far the sacrofoces
~ade.

Moreover, this heightened prestige, acquired by France

through the happy peace of 178), so consolidated the nation that
she weathered the storm which threatened to destory her after

1789.

Atter successfully repelling all invaders, she was able

to reestablish herself on lines compatible with the adVancing
civilization of Europe in which she again took her place as
leader. 7
As a result of the peace of 178) the age-old enmity
~rance

and England gradually abated.

or

Mutual respect took its

place, and today we see the two nations facing together the
problems that remain unsolved in the heart of Europe. 8
As for the relations of America and France, the Comte
:ie Vergennes from the first had worked not for gratitude, knowing

6 Kite, "The Significance of the Treaty", 32.
7 ~ •• 33.

8

llUJ!.

,
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full well that this is never to be expected from any nation,
least of all from republics.
pea.ce.

Instead. he worked for an abiding

It has been said that to understand is to prophesy. Looking
back over a period of a hundred and fifty years may we not
speak with confidence for the future? May we not say that
no matter what pa.ssing clouds may lower, the peace and goodfellowshIp between France and the United States can never
be broken by any war t because in the beginning the foundation
stones were laid upon the eternal principles of justice and
truth t and were cemente~ by fa.ith. generosity. mutual understandlng, and goodwill.

9 Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
From the very beginning of the Revolutionary \ilar, it
was quite evident that no success could be achieved without outside help.

Since the colonists could not obtain what was needed

from England, they had to look elsewhere for supplies.

\'ihen the

Navigation Acts prevented them from openly trading with the
neighboring islands of the West Indies, the Americans learned to
carryon this trade illegally.

It seemed only natural, there-

fore, that they should turn in their need to the French and
Dutch West Indies.
One of the greatest needs was that of gunpowder.

Be-

cause the colonies did not have the materials necessary for its
manufacture, they had to import it from the West Indies.

Almost

all of the r;unpowder imported during the first months of the war
came through the island of St. Eustatlus from Holland.
This tiny island, located in the middle of French and
British possessions. was not restricted in its trade by the
Dutch mother country.

It was, therefore, able to trade with all
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nations and became the Dutch emporium in the vleet Indies.

Gun-

powder and other supplies were sent to St. Eustatius and there
agents of the Thirteen Colonies would buy them and send it where
it was needed.

The island was also used to relay messages from

colonial representatives in Europe to the Continental Congress.
Colonial ships were allowed to anchor and trade at the island.
One of them, the Andrew Doria, saluted the fort on leaving the
harbor and had the salute returned.
British could stand.

This was more than the

When they received no satisfaction for

this insult and for its protest against the illegal trade. England declared war.
Before they knew of the declaration of war, the Dutch
on St. Eustatius were ordered to surrender by the British
Lord Rodney.

admir~

Because of his desire for reveng and profit. Rodney

spent more than three months stripping the island of all its
wealth.

This worked to the advantage of the colonists, for it

enabled De Grasse to join the rest of the French fleet which Was
going to the aid of Washington in the Battle of Yorktown.
The French West Indies, too, played a very definite
part in the Revolutionary War.

In the first place, it was the

fear ot losing her possessi,)ns in the West Indies which brought
France into the war on the side of the colonists.
outcome

ot

Because the

the war was very doubtful, the French did not

immediately give official recognition to the Americans.

For this
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reason. it became necessary to devise an elaborate scheme for
sending secret aid to the colonies.

According to Beaumarchais's

plan, help, both arms and money, was sent to the colonies under
the name of Hortalez and Company.

Supplies were to be sent to

this company in the West Indies and then sent to the colonies.
when, at last, success was assured, France signed a Treaty of
Alliance with the colonies in 1778.
After the treaty was signed, France could send aid
ppenly to the Americans.
French West Indian fleet.
~he

Part or this official aid was the
The fleet accomplished very little in

way or a major victory; its only accomplishment was that it

engaged the British rleet in a rew skirmishes and kept it away
from the North American mainland.
~he

The

greatest contribution of

French fleet to the success ot the Revolution was the naval

~upport

it gave to Washington at the Battle ot Yorkto_n.

With-

put this support it is doubtful if the sieee ot Yorktown would
have been successful.
With the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown British
hopes of regaining the lost colonies vanished.
~nded
~hat

the war was signed at Paris in 178).

The treaty which

One wOLl.ld suppose

the British would want to punish the islands in the West

Indies for the secret aid, as well as the smuggling and illegal
I..Irade, which they gnve to the colonists.
~he

case.

However, this was not

With the exception of the island of Tobago, the 'West

Us
Indies returned to the status quo of 1776.
little reward for their great help.

J

This .earned verT
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